Debates round deep seabed mining (DSM) steadily give attention to the query of when the Worldwide Seabed Authority (ISA) will undertake its rules for mineral exploitation. The ISA was established beneath the 1982 UN Conference on the Regulation of the Sea (UNCLOS) and regulates and governs all DSM on the seabed past nationwide jurisdiction, the “Space”. It additionally decides who receives rights to discover or mine minerals within the Space. In recent times, some corporations and States have positioned strain on the ISA to finalise and undertake its draft exploitation rules. The belief is that these exploitation rules will permit commercial-scale DSM to start out. Nonetheless, this assumption is flawed. The ISA is obligated to undertake one other, solely separate, set of rules earlier than any seabed mining can happen: profit sharing rules. Negotiations for these benefit-sharing rules are at a really early stage. This put up explores the position, necessities, adoption procedures, and standing of those benefit-sharing rules.
Background
Current dialogue on DSM have centered on whether or not and when mining ought to start, notably after Nauru triggered the so-called two-year rule in 2021, an obscure provision within the 1994 Implementing Settlement to UNCLOS, which requires the ISA to finalise rules inside two years. Given quite a few excellent points within the draft rules, the ISA has, unsurprisingly, but to take action. ISA Council members have affirmed that no mining ought to happen within the absence of exploitation rules and a few states oppose setting deadlines. In January 2025, a bunch of exploration contractors urged the ISA to finalise the foundations, falsely implying that doing so would allow mining to start. In the meantime, a rising variety of states (40 as of December 2025) assist a moratorium on mining the Space, due to environmental dangers and a variety of different considerations.
What received misplaced in these discussions about timing and a possible moratorium on mining is the authorized obligation on all UNCLOS member States to make sure that advantages derived from mining the Space are shared equitably. Certainly, the ISA is required to develop and undertake a separate set of rules on benefit-sharing.
Function and necessities of benefit-sharing obligations
The Space and its mineral sources belong to humankind at massive, being legally categorised because the frequent heritage of humankind (UNCLOS, Artwork 136). A key part of this authorized standing is the duty to equitably share monetary and different financial advantages from DSM within the Space, in accordance with the ISA’s benefit-sharing rules, that are but to be developed (UNCLOS, Arts 140, 160(2)(f)(i)).
The significance of those benefit-sharing obligations to the ISA regime can’t be overstated. The raison d’être of the ISA regime is to keep away from a repetition of historic inequities in extractive industries, whereby (corporations from) developed states extracted sources in growing states with the advantages flowing to the previous however not the latter. The ISA represents a rejection of this colonial method to useful resource administration. Thus, guaranteeing that DSM within the Space advantages humankind is a core mandate of the ISA.
As such, it’s crucial for the ISA to develop guidelines and rules on benefit-sharing earlier than any mining software could be entertained. With out figuring out whether or not and what advantages can be shared from DSM, States can be unable to find out if DSM is ‘for the advantage of [hu]mankind’, as required by UNCLOS Article 140(1). As African States highlighted in 2019: ‘The African Group is dedicated to making sure that deep-sea mining solely happens whether it is demonstrably useful to mankind.’
If the ISA was to permit mining within the absence of benefit-sharing rules, it could sanction extraction of frequent heritage sources with out clear compensation for humankind. In different phrases, the ISA would merely be repeating colonial constructions of extractive industries and undermining UNCLOS.
Adoption process for benefit-sharing rules
The excellence between adopting the rules for exploitation and profit sharing originates in UNCLOS, which assigns accountability for benefit-sharing to the Meeting. Each the Finance Committee, the cradle of the benefit-sharing rules, and the Authorized and Technical Fee make suggestions to the ISA Council (UNCLOS, Artwork 165(2)(f); ISBA/29/FC/2; 1994 Settlement, Annex Part 9(7)(f)). The Council then recommends the rules on profit sharing to the Meeting (Artwork 162(2)(o)(i)), which both approves the rules or returns them to the Council for reconsideration (Artwork 160(2)(f)(i)). In contrast to with different rules, similar to these associated to exploitation (Artwork 162(2)(o)(ii)), the Council doesn’t undertake the benefit-sharing rules, and can’t apply them provisionally. As an alternative, the decision-making energy rests with the Meeting. As such, the adoption process for the benefit-sharing rules differs considerably from that for different rules.
Certainly, the facility of the Meeting goes past deciding on the rules, as UNCLOS defers any resolution on equitable sharing of advantages as such to the Meeting (Artwork 160(2)(g)). Thus, the Meeting just isn’t solely liable for the approval but additionally the implementation of the rules associated to profit sharing.
Standing of labor in the direction of benefit-sharing rules
Whereas the Finance Committee issued its first draft rules for equitable sharing of advantages in 2024, the UN Sea-Mattress Committee already thought-about the subject in 1971. Certainly one of its attention-grabbing concepts was for ‘operational bills of the [ISA] equipment [to] be shared by the worldwide group on a unbroken foundation, whereas the revenues to be ultimately derived can be distributed in such a fashion as to favour the growing nations’ (1971 Report, web page 9). It took a long time earlier than the work on these points began once more and when it did, the ISA needed to work inside the funding mannequin decided by UNCLOS, which requires the ISA to fund its administrative bills from its personal revenues as soon as they turn out to be ample, somewhat than counting on State contributions (UNCLOS, Artwork 173). This can essentially scale back the distributable monetary advantages.
Certainly, there can be little cash to distribute within the early years, partly as a result of as soon as mining revenue is generated, the ISA should not solely cowl its administrative prices but additionally help growing mineral producer States whose economies are negatively impacted by DSM (UNCLOS, Artwork 151(10), 1994 Settlement, Annex Part 7). Profit-sharing funds could also be additional lowered by plans to probably repay States at present funding the ISA’s operations (ISA Technical Examine no. 31, web page 25). Thus, the Chair of the Finance Committee famous their work on profit sharing was based mostly on the belief that mining would ‘ship little or no cash.’
Relating to mechanisms for sharing advantages, UNCLOS doesn’t present a lot steering however there are typically two choices: direct distribution to States or a standard fund. The ISA’s present discussions give attention to a ‘Frequent Heritage Fund’. A 2021 ISA research on the matter, co-authored by the then Secretary-Normal, lists arguments towards direct distribution of funds, together with 1) low funds within the early years of deep seabed mining, 2) money disbursements won’t essentially profit humankind however somewhat populations of sure States, and three) the ISA ought to spend money on ‘the best good for mankind as a complete’ somewhat than in sure States (ISA Technical Examine no. 31, web page 28). Equally, in 2023, the earlier ISA Secretary-Normal argued for a fund somewhat than direct distribution, saying a fund may finance capacity-development and scientific analysis.
The present ISA method differs considerably from benefit-sharing via ‘programmes of particular curiosity to growing nations’ articulated in 1971 (report, web page 30). Again then, the main target was on narrowing the hole between industrialised and growing States, notably the least developed states, viewing DSM as a way to cut back world financial inequality. In contrast, present ISA discussions centre on a fund aimed toward ‘make investments[ing] in data and competence associated to the Space’ together with analysis and capability constructing and ‘truly beginning the exploitation’ of seabed minerals (2021 ISA Examine, web page 64). In brief, benefit-sharing aims have shifted from decreasing financial inequalities in the direction of enabling useful resource exploitation. This shift displays a broader departure from the regime’s unique redistributive ambitions.
The distinction between the present aims for the fund and the 1971 imaginative and prescient clarify why the African group voiced its dissatisfaction. The African group additionally criticised the proposal to make use of a Frequent Heritage Fund for restoration and rehabilitation efforts of the deep-sea setting. They rightly argued that such efforts are the accountability of the contractors. Paying for it from what ought to profit the entire of humankind arguably quantities to a ‘pay out and claw again’ association. Certainly, any use of the Fund for actions that contractors are already required to carry out and finance, would ‘scale back the monetary advantages to humankind to subsidise the trade.’
In July 2025, the ISA Council requested the Secretariat ‘to develop the idea of the Frequent Heritage Fund as one of many potential methods for distribution of revenue’, whereas a number of States urged the ISA to maintain all choices for benefit-sharing on the desk (ISBA/30/C/16).
Some argue right here and right here there are nonetheless years to develop benefit-sharing rules, notably if there can be little or no advantages to share within the early years of mining. Nonetheless, commencing mining with out figuring out if it could profit humankind would go towards UNCLOS. The aforementioned ISA Technical Examine underlines this level by stressing that with out, on this case, a Frequent Heritage Fund, ‘it could in all probability be irresponsible to permit precise large-scale mining to proceed’ (web page 67).
Conclusion
Profit-sharing is a core mandate of the ISA and a longstanding precedence for growing States, who maintain the steadiness of energy within the ISA Meeting. Regardless of the absence of settlement on how you can finest share advantages, many States recognise the urgent want to ascertain profit sharing mechanisms.
It could be inconsistent with UNCLOS to permit DSM to start extraction of frequent heritage sources with out figuring out whether or not and what advantages will circulation to humankind. To that finish, the ISA might want to undertake benefit-sharing rules, the event of which is at an early stage. What is obvious from UNCLOS is that these benefit-sharing rules will have to be separate from the draft exploitation rules at present being negotiated.
To disregard this core mandate of the ISA would set a harmful precedent, particularly as States are poised to barter a benefit-sharing mechanism for marine genetic sources beneath the brand new BBNJ Settlement.
