The Proposal to Reform Comitology is Dead. Long Live Comitology!

Introduction

On 11 February 2025, the Fee introduced the withdrawal of the 2017 Proposal to reform the Comitology Regulation. The explanations for the withdrawal are relatively succinct: ‘[n]o foreseeable settlement – the Proposal is blocked and additional progress is unlikely’. Branded by the Fee as a ‘new push for European democracy’, the proposal had arguably way more to do with the Fee’s want to shift the political blame for controversial selections it will undertake, relatively than with a real curiosity in enhancing the legitimacy of comitology-based decision-making. Though basic design flaws affecting EU government rule-making post-Lisbon warrant change, the Fee’s try by the use of a half-hearted proposal was inadequate to handle a minimum of two basic issues of constitutional significance. On this weblog put up, we argue that the rationale of the EU’s institutional design and the normative centrality of the precept of democracy ought to function the idea for a reform of comitology, re-involving the EU legislature in politically delicate instances and boosting participation and transparency by means of new procedural guidelines.

4 Proposed Modifications and Two Basic Points

In essence, the Fee had proposed 4 essential modifications: (i) to disregard abstentions when calculating votes within the attraction committee; in case of no opinion within the attraction committee, (ii) to introduce a second attraction by means of a committee composed by representatives at ministerial degree or (iii) to permit the Fee to ask for a Council’s non-binding opinion; and (iv) to make the voting behaviour of the Member States within the attraction committee public (for detailed feedback, see right here and right here). With its proposal, the Fee tried to handle one necessary lingering problem because the introduction of Article 291 TFEU, that’s, who has management over the implementation of EU legislation. One other basic problem, particularly the relation between comitology-based decision-making and the precept of democracy, was as a substitute fully ignored by the Fee. Though it did suggest to unveil the voting behaviour of Member States within the attraction committee, this may be thought to be motivated by political blame-shifting relatively than true considerations of democracy.

Management over Union Implementation of EU Legislation

Importantly, the proposed amendments of comitology would have introduced again political management over, and accountability for, implementing decision-making. The Fee visibly struggled with how to do that and instructed, on the one hand, to deliver the Council again into comitology-based decision-making by formulating a non-binding opinion and, on the opposite, so as to add an additional layer within the decision-making course of by means of the introduction of a committee composed of representatives at ministerial degree. But, the concept to deliver again within the Council was strongly opposed by the Council Authorized Service and the Member States. This opposition was rooted within the view that, because of the modifications led to by the Lisbon Treaty, Article 291 TFEU would now reserve implementation of EU legislation for the Member States solely. Accordingly, the Council Authorized Service argued that this proposal went ‘past the function envisaged by the Treaties for the Council and could be in breach of the precept of institutional steadiness’, and encroached ‘on the competence of the Member States as foreseen by the Treaties’. The Council primarily based itself on a strict, textual studying of Article 291(3) TFEU that assigns the accountability to manage the train of implementing powers by the Fee to the Member States alone, to the exclusion of the Parliament and the Council.

Such a slender studying is, nonetheless, not in keeping with the underlying rationale of the EU’s constitutional and institutional buildings – therefore, the institutional steadiness – and the democratic precept laid down in Articles 9 to 12 TEU. Furthermore, it disregards the truth that the EU’s two basic competences below Articles 114 and 352 TFEU embody additionally government powers. Subsequently, adopting a contextual interpretation, implementing powers delegated to the Fee by the EU legislature (a minimum of within the train of such basic competences) must be learn as falling below the political supervision of the EU’s legislature. It follows that the Fee was proper in its want to deliver the Council again in. As a matter of truth, this interpretation can also be partially mirrored within the present Comitology Regulation, and specifically in its Article 11. The latter recognises an (albeit restricted) function for each the Council and the Parliament in overseeing the train of implementing powers. That is completed by the use of a restricted proper of scrutiny that permits the co-legislators to point the place, of their view, a draft implementing act would exceed the implementing powers supplied for within the primary act. Evidently, if the proper studying of Article 291 TFEU was the strict one advocated by the Council Authorized Service, Article 291(3) TFEU might haven’t served because the authorized foundation for Article 11 of the Comitology Regulation.

That stated, abandoning the strict, textual studying of Article 291(3) TFEU in favour of a contextual interpretation permits not solely to uphold the legitimacy of the present Comitology Regulation, but in addition to consider a extra radical and easy reform. Essential could be to provide a veto proper to each the Parliament and the Council in comitology-based decision-making. This is able to allow them to dam Fee decision-making in conditions of irreconcilable positions among the many Member States within the setting of an attraction committee, figuring out the result of decision-making procedures in politically delicate dossiers akin to, for instance, GMOs and pesticides. On this sense, the mechanism could be just like the facility to object at the moment foreseen within the framework of delegated acts below Article 290 TFEU: the place the Parliament and the Council wouldn’t make use of their opposition powers, the Fee could be obliged to undertake the acts, whereas, the place the Parliament or the Council would oppose, the draft implementing act wouldn’t be adopted.

Constitutional Necessities of the Precept of Democracy

The Fee’s 2017 proposal fully neglected the function of the Parliament and didn’t deal with the necessities stemming from the precept of democracy. That is problematic when contemplating that the constitutional framing of EU government rule-making must be learn in gentle of this precept as set forth in Articles 9 to 12 TEU. The latter, certainly, recognise that the functioning of the Union is based on each consultant and participatory democracy. This horizontal normative framework informs all areas of EU decision-making, together with each delegated and implementing acts and thereby underpinning their democratic legitimacy. Subsequently, the legitimacy of EU government decision-making rests on the respect for the precept of democracy, taking into consideration, specifically, transparency and participation.

Operationalisation of the precept of democracy inside the framework of EU government rule-making, we argue, ought to proceed alongside two strains. First, the Parliament ought to play a considerable function in politically delicate issues. Unsurprisingly, after receiving the Fee’s reform proposal, the European Parliament, who had lengthy fought to be positioned on equal footing because the Council in comitology, reacted by proposing important amendments. The latter would have, inter alia, recognised the Parliament’s function as co-advisor along with the Council and broadened the suitable of scrutiny additionally to instances wherein the draft implementing act is in battle with the targets of the essential act. As defined above, we advocate for an much more distinguished function for each branches of the EU legislature, within the type of a veto proper.

Second, participation in decision-making past consultant establishments, as enshrined in Article 11 TEU, ought to function a complementary supply of democratic legitimacy additionally for government acts. This necessitates procedural guidelines able to, on the one hand, detailing participatory engagement in government rule-making and, on the opposite, enhancing transparency. Key goal of such guidelines could be to handle and overcome well-known hurdles to participation akin to articulation, illustration, and organisation of pursuits. This reform would permit government rule-making to transcend being merely ‘science-based’ to boost the information and accumulate extra info within the particular dossiers. Certainly, it will crucially reply to the normative democratic crucial for participatory engagement. Presently, the Fee is already opening up the making of delegated and implementing acts to specialists, stakeholders, and the general public. But, the Fee has unfettered discretion on this respect, and it views participation as an instrument to gather info for evidence-based policymaking relatively than as a normative democratic obligation. The controversial dossiers on GMOs, glyphosate, and probably sooner or later novel meals, exhibit that participatory engagement in comitology-based decision-making in advanced controversial dossiers is required for each causes.

Lastly, and in the identical vein, safeguarding democratic legitimacy requires acknowledging that, as highlighted by Leino-Sandberg on this Weblog, ‘figuring out the extent of transparency and entry to paperwork is legally not on the discretion of particular person establishments, however a normative selection made within the Treaty of Lisbon and the Constitution’. On this respect, latest case-law regarding the Fee’s obligation to provide entry to the person positions of the Member States in committee conferences ought to function a foundation for designing a extra clear regime.

Outlook

The place the demarcation between delegated and implementing acts is constitutionally questionable and really a lot blurred in follow, we view a return to a merged system of delegated and implementing acts, and therefore to an built-in government rule-making system, to be essential. Nevertheless, to reform comitology, one should not await Treaty change. It’s clear that the controversial instances talked about above unveil the naivety of the idea {that a} rational legislature will at all times be capable of predict which dossiers would possibly develop into politically delicate. Comitology, as a filter for political sensitivities, continues to be mechanism to establish such dossiers. In gentle of the above, we argue that reform of comitology is required as decision-making on advanced controversial subjects requires broad political acceptance and respect for the precept of democracy. This may be achieved by the use of, first, re-involving the EU legislature every time science alone can’t present a conclusive reply and Member States and the Fee can’t discover settlement, and, second, setting procedural guidelines detailing participatory engagement and boosting transparency in EU government rule-making. In the end, all this underlines the necessity to rethink the normative areas for delegated rule-making and to watch democratic mechanisms and necessities, akin to participatory engagement and transparency.

Guido Bellenghi is a PhD candidate in EU legislation at Maastricht College.

Ellen Vos is Professor of EU legislation at Maastricht College. They’re the authors of ‘Rethinking the Constitutional Structure of EU Government Rulemaking: Treaty Change and Enhanced Democracy’.