Christmas Day Cable Cuts in the Baltic Sea

In lower than 14 months, submarine telecommunications cables connecting Estonia, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, Russia, and Sweden have been lower 9 instances within the Baltic Sea. As well as, an underwater electrical energy cable and a fuel pipeline have been lower by a ship anchor. These damages occurred in three separate incidents all involving a international industrial ship dragging an anchor on the seafloor for over 100 kilometres.

The NewNew Polar Bear incident occurred in October 2023, the Yi Peng 3 incident occurred in November 2024, and the Eagle S incident happened on 25 December 2024. As indicated on the map under, nearly all objects of the Estonian crucial offshore infrastructure positioned exterior the bounds of the territorial sea had been broken within the NewNew Polar Bear and Eagle S incidents. The ESTLINK 1 electrical energy cable and three knowledge cables had been unhurt, owing to Finland’s decisive intervention within the Eagle S incident.

Map 1. Injury to the crucial offshore infrastructure within the Gulf of Finland within the NewNew Polar Bear and the Eagle S incidents. This map serves an illustrative goal solely.

Supply: Primarily based on the Submarine Cable Map and Marine Visitors knowledge.

The Eagle S Incident

In December 2024, the submarine electrical energy cable ESTLINK 2 connecting Estonia and Finland and 4 knowledge cables had been lower within the Finnish unique financial zone (EEZ). Of those, three submarine telecommunications cables (FEC-1, FEC-2, CITIC Telecom) join Estonia and Finland, whereas the C-Lion1 (which was additionally lower within the Yi Peng 3 incident of November 2024, see right here for my earlier submit on the incident) is the one telecommunications cable linking Finland and Germany. The ESTLINK 2 cable was lower within the Finnish EEZ, and the restore works would possibly final till summer season 2025. Because of a fault and expensive repairs, ESTLINK 2 was out of operation for 9 months earlier in 2024, elevating electrical energy prices in Estonia by a few tenth.

Because the Eagle S continued the anchor-dragging and sailed westward, the Finnish Defence Forces and Coast Guard intervened off Helsinki and Tallinn (see Map 1). They used a patrol ship and two helicopters to cease and board the Prepare dinner Islands-flagged Eagle S, forming a part of the Russian sanctions-busting ‘shadow fleet’. The ship was stopped simply earlier than it might have crossed the ESTLINK 1 electrical energy cable, the Balticconnector fuel pipeline, and different underwater cables.

The chronology of the occasions is described right here and right here. Briefly, the Finnish patrol ship Turva began to shadow the Eagle S off Helsinki and observed that its anchor was dropped. Turva requested the Eagle S to boost its anchor and enter the Finnish territorial sea. The Eagle S complied with the order. As the numerous tons heavy anchor chain of the Eagle S was heaved up, it grew to become clear that the ship had misplaced its predominant anchor.

The particular forces (Karhu) of the Finnish Defence Forces and the Coast Guard boarded the ship from two helicopters and took command of the Eagle S after the ship had entered the Finnish territorial sea (see Map 2). The Finnish President Mr. Alexander Stubb confirmed that the ship was boarded within the Finnish territorial sea.

Map 2. The Estonian and Finnish Maritime Zones within the Gulf of Finland

Supply: This map was initially revealed right here.

It’s unclear whether or not Finland consulted with the flag State previous to interdicting the ship. In any occasion, the flag State consent to board and seize the ship was not required because the Finnish legal guidelines had been enforced solely after the ship had agreed to enter the Finnish territorial sea. But, notably, in keeping with the Finnish press report, the Finnish authorities had been able to take measures in opposition to the ship even when it had not agreed to enter the Finnish territorial sea. On this time-critical scenario, this might have been essential to keep away from damages to the ESTLINK 1 electrical energy cable, the Balticconnector fuel pipeline, and to the opposite submarine knowledge cables (see Map 1).

The Finnish investigation is underway into the damages prompted to the offshore infrastructure as aggravated felony mischief. A 3-kilometer no-fly zone was established across the ship, the Eagle S that’s loaded with 35,000 tons of unleaded Russian petrol was arrested and brought to the Svartbäck inside anchorage space, whereas a 1-mile-wide no-enter zone was established across the ship. The Finnish felony jurisdiction might be exercised on the grounds of the harm prompted to the submarine cables and, probably, for violating the European Union (EU) sanctions. The EU has prohibited the shipments of Russia’s oil to non-EU international locations, except these merchandise are being bought in accordance with the oil value cap. The violation of the sanctions is against the law on the EU stage.

Hello-tech transmitting and receiving units used for intelligence functions had been discovered on-board the ship (see right here and right here). For my part, if the proof exhibits {that a} international State orchestrated and instructed the assault in opposition to the crucial offshore infrastructure with the intention of chopping the bulk, if not all the coastal State’s knowledge cables, its electrical energy cables, and the submarine fuel pipeline, thereby inflicting damages of a whole bunch of thousands and thousands of euros and potential disruptions within the public providers (web, electrical energy, and so forth), then it may doubtlessly be labeled as a use of drive reaching the extent of an armed assault underneath Article 51 of the United Nations Constitution.

It’s moderately unlikely that the Eagle S incident could be challenged earlier than a world court docket or tribunal because the flag State has distanced itself from the ship and Finland exercised its felony jurisdiction in its territorial sea (Artwork 23 of the UNCLOS) and never inside the EEZ hall within the Gulf of Finland the place the coastal State’s proper of interdiction in response to such incidents is unclear and untested.

The Eagle S Incident as a Precedent

The interdiction of the Eagle S by the Finnish Defence Forces and the Coast Guard units a precedent that may be adopted by different States sooner or later. It’s vital for a lot of causes. Most significantly, it’s the first time that the Baltic Sea coastal State has taken resolute steps in opposition to a industrial ship caught ‘red-handed’ for a suspected intentional damaging of the coastal State’s crucial offshore infrastructure.

In October 2023, the Hong Kong-flagged container ship NewNew Polar Bear broken within the Finnish and Estonian EEZ the Balticconnector pipeline that runs between Finland and Estonia and three submarine telecommunications cables. The flag State (China) has confirmed that the NewNew Polar Bear broken the pipeline and the submarine cables along with her anchor. But it has been difficult to collect the mandatory proof to resolve whether or not it was an accident or an intentional act, because the flag State has not cooperated with the investigation. Henrik Ringbom and I’ve mentioned the implications of this incident to the regulation of the ocean right here.

In November 2024, a submarine telecommunications cable linking Lithuania and Sweden and the C-Lion1 submarine telecommunications cable linking Finland and Germany had been lower in Sweden’s EEZ. I analysed the authorized avenues for boarding and inspecting the suspected ship Yi Peng 3 and suggested that, regardless of whether or not the ship cooperates with the authorities and whether or not the coastal State authorities obtain the flag State’s consent to examine the Yi Peng 3 within the Danish EEZ, the coastal authorities might depend on further authorized bases for interdicting the Yi Peng 3. It seems that, apart stopping the ship, these avenues had been basically not used within the Yi Peng 3 case, main China to disclaim Sweden’s request for prosecutors to board the ship. Yi Peng 3 departed from the Danish EEZ lower than per week earlier than the Eagle S incident.

In response to the Eagle S incident, the Estonian Prime Minister Mr. Kristen Michal signalled that Finland’s ‘utterly novel response’ to the safety of crucial offshore infrastructure exterior the bounds of the territorial sea is a welcome improvement. It was preceded with the Finnish Defence Minister Mr. Häkkänen’s assertion within the aftermath of the Yi Peng 3 incident, in keeping with which it’s fairly clear that if crucial infrastructure has been destroyed or severely broken, and it’s vital to seek out out who did it, then it can’t be a scenario the place the sufferer State doesn’t intervene.

Nonetheless, even after the Christmas Day cable cuts, the query stays about whether or not the coastal State can board and seize a industrial ship within the EEZ if it damages the coastal State’s crucial offshore infrastructure? Sadly, the present authorized framework doesn’t present a transparent reply to this query. Nonetheless, for my part, the reply is constructive. However there are vital caveats. Most significantly, the proper of interdiction is extra complicated in relation to cable cuts, since they don’t trigger environmental air pollution (in contrast to a pipeline rupture). Due to this fact, presumably, the coastal State can not base its enforcement jurisdiction on Articles 79(2) and 221 of the UNCLOS.

Requires Offering a Stronger Authorized Regime for the Safety of Offshore Infrastructure

The Eagle S incident has led Estonia to contemplate avenues for growing the authorized certainty in respect of the safety of crucial infrastructure exterior the bounds of the territorial sea. The Estonian Authorities convened a day after the Eagle S incident for an emergency assembly. On the press convention, the Estonian Prime Minister, the Minister of the Inside, and the Minister of Justice and Digital Affairs careworn the significance of adjusting the authorized framework in order that it might be higher fitted to addressing the safety hole in respect of the safety of crucial offshore infrastructure. The Estonian Prime Minister promised to boost this challenge on the European Union and NATO ranges.

The Minister of Justice and Digital Affairs introduced that the Estonian Authorities will apply to the Worldwide Maritime Group by February 2025 to replace the authorized framework in relation to the safety of crucial offshore infrastructure. At this stage, it’s unclear what the potential proposals for closing the safety hole within the authorized framework relevant to submarine cables and pipelines would possibly entail. To open the dialogue, I’m elevating a few concepts, whereas acknowledging that any efficient measures for closing the present safety hole would seemingly negatively impression the liberty of navigation. I’m afraid that that is the value States must pay for safeguarding the underwater choke factors of the web and vitality transportation exterior the bounds of the territorial sea.

As steered by Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg (at p. 311), one chance is to contemplate granting common enforcement jurisdiction in respect of ships suspected of damaging submarine pipelines and cables exterior the bounds of the territorial sea. Such common jurisdiction has been granted over piracy and unauthorized broadcasting on the excessive seas and within the EEZ underneath Articles 58(2) and 110(1) of the UNCLOS. Given the significance of submarine pipelines and submarine cables that carry over 95% of world web site visitors and thus function the spine of the worldwide internet-based world economic system, an analogous authorized method to that of tackling piracy and unauthorized broadcasting would, for my part, be cheap for the safety of crucial offshore infrastructure positioned exterior the bounds of the territorial sea. The Estonian Minister of Justice and Digital Affairs Ms. Liisa Pakosta hinted at this in a latest interview for the Reuters.

In keeping with the dominant view amongst States, Article 113 of the UNCLOS, which regulates the breaking or damage of a submarine cable or pipeline, doesn’t present for common jurisdiction. Felony jurisdiction might be carried out by the related coastal State, and provided that the cable is broken by a nationwide of the coastal State or a ship flying its flag. States may cut back these limitations by constructing on Article 10 of the 1884 Paris Conference for the Safety of Submarine Cables Exterior the Territorial Sea. However the issue with Article 10, which is taken into account by america to kind a part of customary worldwide regulation (at p. 16), is that it permits to board a ship exterior the territorial sea and solely query the crew. Would there be room for granting common enforcement jurisdiction for inspecting and, if vital, detaining the suspected ship and its crew for damaging crucial offshore infrastructure exterior the bounds of the territorial sea?

Alternatively, States may take into account reaching a broader understanding on whether or not the worldwide regulation of the ocean permits to ascertain security zones round submarine cables and pipelines within the EEZ. Within the EEZ, it’s permitted to ascertain security zones round and above such subsea services as synthetic islands, installations and buildings, whereas submarine cables and pipelines are excluded from the scope of Article 60(4) of the UNCLOS. The 2024 report of the ILA Committee on Submarine Cables and Pipelines discovered that security zones are usually not permitted round cables and pipelines as they don’t qualify underneath the definition of installations and buildings, although the Committee could be open to the concept that there could be authorized developments which assist the institution of security zones round cables within the EEZ sooner or later (at pp. 22-23).

The Danish Cable Order together with the Offshore Security Act, New Zealand’s Submarine Cables and Pipelines Safety Act (Part 12), and the Australian Telecommunications Laws (Sections 3a, 36-38, 44A)  appear to sign that it’s attainable to ascertain security zones round submarine cables and pipelines additionally within the EEZ. Although this observe could be thought-about as ‘creeping jurisdiction’, it may present – together with different authorized ideas, together with the proper of sizzling pursuit – an efficient measure for closing the present safety hole embedded within the UNCLOS particularly for these coastal States which might be depending on the safety of their underwater infrastructure.

Security zones haven’t been established within the EEZ hall of the Gulf of Finland the place damages to quite a few knowledge and energy cables in addition to to the submarine fuel pipeline occurred in October 2023 and December 2024. Nonetheless, the Finnish response to the damaging of the 5 submarine cables in December 2024 showcased to some extent how the interdiction based mostly on the security zones (Artwork 60(4-7) of the UNCLOS) and sizzling pursuit (Artwork 111 of the UNCLOS) may doubtlessly be effectuated in observe, if allowed to be utilized in respect of cables and pipelines within the EEZ.

Notably, security zones can’t be established on the excessive seas. Their use could be restricted to the territorial sea and EEZ the place cables and pipelines are principally broken by ship anchors (probably, as a result of the ocean tends to be not as deep as on the excessive seas). Thus, it might promise a brand new safety mechanism for cables and pipelines positioned in most regional and semi-enclosed seas, such because the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the North Sea, and the Baltic Sea, and different maritime areas which might be totally topic to the coastal States’ jurisdiction. The protection zones allow the coastal State to broaden the attain of her enforcement jurisdiction within the related elements of the EEZ in respect of ships suspected of damaging crucial offshore infrastructure, whereas not in any other case impeding the free navigation of ships that aren’t suspected of damaging crucial offshore infrastructure.

Conclusion

The Christmas Day incident within the Gulf of Finland marks the primary profitable response of the Baltic Sea coastal State to a suspected intentional damaging of crucial offshore infrastructure positioned exterior the bounds of the territorial sea. Recognising the coastal State’s proper to interdict a ship that’s caught ‘red-handed’ within the EEZ for the damages prompted to underwater infrastructure and for stopping additional destruction of cables and pipelines on the seafloor is critical to reply to the challenges posed by hybrid warfare at sea.