Normative and institutional context
On 20 January 2026, the Secretary-Normal of the Worldwide Seabed Authority (the ‘Authority’) – the worldwide group established underneath the United Nations Conference on the Legislation of the Sea (the ‘Conference’) to prepare and management mineral-related actions within the deep seabed past nationwide jurisdiction (Article 157, UNCLOS) – notified Member States of an software submitted by Nauru Ocean Sources, Inc. (NORI) for an extension of its authorized plan of labor for the exploration of polymetallic nodules within the japanese Pacific Ocean. NORI’s exploration contract was concluded with the Authority on 22 July 2011 for a interval of fifteen years, and the requested extension would cowl the interval from 22 July 2026 to 21 July 2031.
The Authorized and Technical Fee (the ‘Fee’) – an professional subsidiary organ accountable inter alia for reviewing contractors’ purposes and submitting applicable suggestions to the Council (Article 165(2)(b)) – will study the appliance at its forthcoming assembly throughout the first a part of the Authority’s thirty-first session (23 February–6 March 2026). The matter can also be included on the provisional agenda of the Council, which is the Authority’s government organ chargeable for approving plans of labor for exploration and for supervising and controlling actions within the Space (Article 162(2)(a) and (j)).
This improvement marks a essential juncture for the Authority. NORI is an entirely owned subsidiary of The Metals Firm, Inc. (TMC), which has concurrently sought authorisation for business deep-sea mining by way of one other subsidiary, The Metals Firm USA, LLC (TMC USA) underneath United States home regulation. That software – primarily based on an government order issued in April 2025 along with the Deep Seabed Arduous Mineral Sources Act (DSHMRA) – considerations the identical geographic space as NORI’s exploration contract underneath the Conference and would allow unilateral exploitation outdoors the Conference’s multilateral framework.
The pending extension request thus confronts the Authority with a query that goes nicely past the administration of a single plan of labor. As Lathrop and Nodewald have persuasively argued on this weblog (see right here), what’s at stake is whether or not the Authority can protect the integrity of the Conference regime for the deep seabed within the face of company methods that search to function concurrently inside and out of doors the multilateral framework. The choice on NORI’s extension will decide whether or not participation within the authorized regime established underneath the Conference relies upon solely on the formal compliance of the person authorized entities which might be events to the contract, or whether or not the Authority is entitled to evaluate the financial actuality of the connection between NORI and TMC, notably the place parallel conduct could undermine the multilateral regime and the foundational rules on which it rests, together with exclusivity, good religion, fairness, and efficient management.
This contribution proceeds in 4 steps. It first situates the pending extension request throughout the institutional apply of the Authority and up to date Council deliberations on contractor compliance. It then explains why the idea of ‘financial unity’, as developed in EU competitors regulation, provides a helpful analytical lens for assessing company methods working throughout regulatory frameworks. The evaluation then applies this angle to the TMC group and NORI’s extension request, analyzing the implications for the effectiveness of the Conference regime. Lastly, the contribution considers whether or not, and underneath what circumstances, a refusal to increase NORI’s exploration contract may represent a lawful train of the Authority’s powers, in gentle of the broader goals of Half XI of the Conference.
Company construction, compliance, and the Authority’s regulatory considerations
The relevance of this subject – the authorized penalties arising from the hyperlinks between NORI and TMC – was already obvious throughout the Authority’s July 2025 session, within the context of protracted Council negotiations culminating in Resolution ISBA/30/C/19. In that call, the Council requested the Secretary-Normal, pursuant to part 10.3 of the usual clauses for exploration contracts, to require extra data from contractors vulnerable to non-compliance with their contractual obligations.
Moreover, the Council urged the Fee to offer particular consideration to potential non-compliance by contractors with their obligation – extending to their staff, subcontractors, brokers, and all different individuals engaged by them within the conduct of operations underneath exploration contracts – to look at relevant regulation. This obligation is of specific relevance the place such non-compliance could end result from direct or oblique actions referring to actions within the Space, together with the contractual responsibility to behave in accordance with the phrases of the contract, the principles, rules and procedures of the Authority, Half XI of the Conference, the Settlement and different guidelines of worldwide regulation not incompatible with the Conference (ISBA/19/C/17, Annex III, Part 27.1-2).
These passages replicate an institutional consciousness that compliance underneath the Conference regime can’t be assessed solely by reference to the formal conduct of a single authorized entity in isolation. Somewhat, they level to a priority with substantive compliance, together with the broader company and operational context by which contractors function.
From company kind to financial actuality: why EU regulation is related
It’s on this context that the jurisprudence of the Courtroom of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the ‘financial unity’ principle turns into analytically instructive. Beneath this principle, legal responsibility for anti-competitive conduct could come up both upstream, from a subsidiary to its guardian firm (‘bottom-up’ course of), or downstream, from a guardian firm to its subsidiary (‘top-down’ course of). The latter risk was authoritatively clarified within the Courtroom’s judgment of 6 October 2021 in Sumal SL v Mercedes Benz Vehicles España (Case C-882/19). In Sumal, the CJEU reaffirmed a precept that has develop into central to competitors regulation: company separateness can’t be handled as dispositive the place a guardian firm and its subsidiaries collectively represent a “single financial unit”. The Courtroom held that decisive financial and organisational management, moderately than formal authorized character, is determinative.
The relevance of Sumal doesn’t lie within the transposition of EU competitors regulation as such into the regulation of the ocean. Somewhat, its significance is practical. The judgment displays a broader regulatory logic shared by totally different authorized regimes: the place regulatory goals rely on exclusivity and systemic coherence, formal company fragmentation can’t be allowed to undermine their effectiveness. A comparable concern is embedded within the Conference itself. Beneath Articles 137, 139, and 153, and as clarified by the 2011 Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the Worldwide Tribunal for the Legislation of the Sea, the Authority regime privileges efficient management and substantive due diligence over formal authorized preparations. On this sense, Sumal and the Advisory Opinion converge on a shared precept: the place authorized kind and financial actuality diverge, regulatory evaluation could observe substance moderately than kind.
The TMC group as a unified financial technique
In opposition to this background, NORI’s software can’t be assessed in isolation from the broader company context by which it operates. NORI is wholly owned by TMC, financially depending on it, and embedded inside an built-in company construction. Strategic choices regarding financing, technological improvement, and regulatory engagement look like taken on the group degree, as mirrored in TMC’s public technical and financial assessments of the NORI-D challenge and within the revised sponsorship preparations concluded with the Authorities of Nauru.
In parallel, TMC USA has indicated its intention to pursue authorisation underneath United States regulation, on the idea that revised home procedures could provide a extra predictable pathway towards business restoration. Whereas these actions elevate distinct authorized questions, they kind a part of a unified company technique that’s related when assessing compliance with the Conference framework as a complete.
From the angle outlined above, this unity of technique has authorized significance. Beneath the Conference, it raises questions regarding the obligation of excellent religion (Article 300) and the exclusivity of the multilateral regime governing the widespread heritage of humankind (Articles 136 and 137). Treating NORI as a completely autonomous authorized actor for regulatory functions would threat exactly the sort of formalism that each EU competitors regulation and the regulation of the ocean search to keep away from.
Regulatory uncertainty and institutional accountability
On the identical time, the conduct of TMC USA may be understood towards the backdrop of extended regulatory uncertainty on the worldwide degree. In 2019, following 5 years of intensive technical work and session, the Fee submitted a complete draft of exploitation rules to the Council. Since then, two self-imposed deadlines for his or her adoption have handed, and substantive negotiations have repeatedly been overshadowed by procedural disputes. As of July 2025, the Council remained unable even to agree on a roadmap for persevering with its work (see Council Resolution ISBA/30/C/18).
This regulatory delay doesn’t justify unilateral motion outdoors the Conference framework. Nonetheless, it types a part of the factual context by which contractors have structured their engagement with the regime and inside which the Authority should train its regulatory discretion.
Denial of an extension and the broader goals of Half XI of the Conference
Beneath the Authority’s regulatory framework, extensions of exploration contracts should not computerized entitlements. They require a suggestion by the Fee and approval by the Council, which permits for a substantive evaluation of continued compatibility with the goals of Half XI of the Conference. On this context, the Authority could take into account whether or not granting an extension would undermine the efficient operation of the regime governing the Space. This analysis doesn’t represent an endorsement of previous conduct, however moderately a forward-looking evaluation of ongoing eligibility inside a system primarily based on fairness, good religion, exclusivity, and cooperation.
Nonetheless, any determination to disclaim an extension have to be located throughout the broader goals of Half XI of the Conference. Article 148 requires specific regard to be given to the efficient participation of growing States, together with Small Island Growing States, in actions within the Space. For a lot of such States, participation will depend on partnerships with non-public actors possessing the mandatory monetary and technological capability. Selections on contract extensions, due to this fact, have implications past the contractor involved, affecting the sensible means of sponsoring States to take part within the widespread heritage regime. Whereas these concerns don’t restrict the Authority’s authorized discretion, they’re related to assessing the broader systemic penalties of its choices.
Conclusion
The authorized instruments required to deal with challenges pertaining to deep seabed mining exist already. When assessing purposes for extensions of exploration contracts, the Worldwide Seabed Authority is justified in trying past formal company buildings to underlying financial substance, the place failure to take action would undermine the efficient operation of the deep seabed mining regime. On the identical time, such assessments should stay attentive to the Conference’s dedication to inclusive participation and to the institutional penalties of sustained regulatory inaction.
* Views and opinions expressed on this submit are these of the creator and don’t essentially replicate the official views or positions of Spain.










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