Russian plane, drones and missiles have violated NATO airspace dozens of occasions because the full-scale invasion of Ukraine started in February 2022.
Individually, many of those incidents seem minor: a drone crash right here, a short fighter incursion there, a missile found solely after the very fact.
However taken collectively, I imagine the numbers inform a much more troubling story.
To get a full image of the dimensions of violations, I carried out a scientific evaluate of Russian airspace violations towards NATO members from 2022 by way of the tip of 2025.
It reveals not simply a rise however a pointy acceleration accompanied by rising severity and widening geographic scope. In 2025 alone, NATO members recorded 18 confirmed Russian airspace violations – thrice as many as in 2024 and greater than half of all incidents recorded over the four-year interval. This was not a gradual escalation; it was a dramatic change.
Selecting up tempo
I recognized airspace violations by way of a scientific evaluate of worldwide information media protection, corroborated with official NATO press releases and cross-validated towards operational assessments and geospatial reporting from the Institute for the Research of Conflict. Included have been violations of airspace by drones closely suspected to be Russian however that might not be 100% confirmed.
Between 2022 and 2024, the annual variety of violations rose steadily however modestly. There have been 4 incidents in 2022, 5 in 2023 and 6 in 2024.
That corresponds to year-on-year will increase of roughly 25% and 20%. In 2025, the depend jumped from six to 18, a 200% enhance in a single 12 months. And that tempo has continued into 2026 – as of Feb. 18 there have been no less than two violations of NATO airspace by Russia.
Such a surge is statistically and strategically important. It strongly means that Russian airspace violations are now not episodic spillovers from the conflict in Ukraine, however a part of a sustained sample of stress directed at NATO itself.
The character of those incidents has additionally modified. In 2022, all 4 violations have been what I classify as low-intensity occasions: temporary incursions into Swedish airspace by Russian fighters, the crash of an Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone in Romania and the later discovery of a Russian cruise missile in Poland. These incidents have been severe however short-lived and geographically restricted.
By 2023, violations had change into extra repetitive. Romania alone skilled a number of drone incursions and particles discoveries over a number of months, usually triggering fighter scrambles. All 5 incidents that 12 months fell right into a midrange severity class: extra persistent than earlier than however nonetheless largely confined to frame areas.
The transition towards higher-intensity incursions turned clearer in 2024. Of the six violations that 12 months, half concerned high-severity traits equivalent to deeper penetration of a NATO nation or broader geographic publicity.
A Russian cruise missile crossed into Polish airspace, drones entered Romania on a number of consecutive nights, and a Russian drone crashed properly inside Latvian territory. These incidents expanded each the depth and the geographic footprint of violations.
Then got here 2025. Of the 18 violations recorded that 12 months, a transparent majority qualify as high-severity occasions. These embrace a Russian drone that penetrated almost 60 miles (100 kilometers) into Polish territory earlier than crashing close to Osiny with out prior radar detection; a drone that remained inside Romanian airspace for roughly 4 hours, crossing a number of counties earlier than crashing in Vaslui; and an enormous 21-drone swarm over Poland on Sept. 9-10 that pressured the closure of main civilian airports in Warsaw, Rzeszów and Lublin.
Manned plane additionally returned in pressure. Russian MiG-31 interceptors flew over Estonia for about 12 minutes with transponders – onboard gadgets that routinely reply to radar alerts by transmitting an plane’s id and altitude, enabling air site visitors management and air protection programs to trace it – switched off. In October, a Russian Su-30 fighter accompanied by an Il-78 refueling tanker violated Lithuanian airspace – an unmistakable sign of endurance and deliberate mission planning.
In December, suspected Russian drones have been shot down and later recovered in Turkey on a number of dates, indicating a persistent provocation fairly than a one-off incursion.
Maybe most strikingly, Western Europe was seemingly now not exempt. On Dec. 4, 2025, 5 unidentified drones flew over France’s Île Longue naval base, house to the nation’s nuclear ballistic missile submarines. French personnel reportedly fired on the suspected Russian drones.
Simply weeks later, on Christmas Day, Polish fighters intercepted a Russian reconnaissance plane over the Baltic Sea.
Gray-zone techniques
Severity and frequency will not be the one dimensions that modified. Geographical attain has, too.
In 2022, Russian violations affected three NATO members. By 2024, that quantity had grown to 4. In 2025, it expanded to 6: Romania, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Turkey and France.
Stress was utilized concurrently within the Black Sea area, the Baltic states and Western Europe.
This widening scope issues as a result of it undermines the concept these incidents are localized accidents. As a substitute, they resemble a distributed sample of Russia probing throughout NATO’s japanese and southern flanks and into its strategic core.
NATO’s political response displays this shift. For the primary time because the conflict started, members invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the mechanism for collective session when a member feels its safety is threatened.
Poland did so after the September 2025 drone swarm, and Estonia adopted after the MiG-31 incursion later that month. Though solely two of the 18 incidents triggered Article 4, their timing is revealing: No such invocations occurred within the earlier three years mixed.
From a strategic standpoint, the hazard lies much less in any single violation than of their cumulative impact. Airspace incursions sit in a gray zone between peace and open battle. They impose operational and psychological prices, check air protection programs and supply useful intelligence on NATO’s detection thresholds and response occasions, all whereas staying beneath the authorized threshold of armed assault.
Testing NATO’s resolve
The information from 2025 and early 2026 present that this grey-zone exercise has intensified dramatically. A threefold enhance in a single 12 months, coupled with a shift towards deeper, longer and extra disruptive incidents throughout a number of theaters, factors to a deliberate marketing campaign fairly than unintentional spillover.
For NATO, the implication is obvious. Monitoring particular person incidents is now not adequate. What now issues is the speed of acceleration, the severity profile and the geographic dispersion of violations.
If present tendencies persist because the conflict in Ukraine enters its fifth 12 months, the alliance’s biggest problem is probably not responding to a single dramatic breach however managing the mounting stress created by many smaller ones – every calibrated to check resolve with out triggering open battle.








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