In April 2026, relations between Ukraine and Israel have been shaken by a substantial diplomatic disaster. In distinction to Ukraine’s latest quarrel with Hungary over the (doubtless unlawful) interception and seizure of a Ukrainian cash transport by Hungarian authorities, this dispute was not preceded by years of deteriorating bilateral relations. For the reason that starting of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the connection between Israel and Ukraine has principally been pragmatic and cooperative—regardless of some tensions attributable to Israel’s determination to not impose sanctions on Russia or immediately provide Ukraine with weapons. Nevertheless, this started to vary on April 12, when the Russian-flagged bulk service Abinsk docked on the Israeli port of Haifa and unloaded as much as 44,000 tons of wheat. In response to Ukrainian investigative journalist Kateryna Yaresko, this grain no less than partially originated within the occupied Japanese Ukrainian territories. The import of this grain into Israel drew sharp protest from Ukraine, which led to a different vessel allegedly carrying grain from the occupied areas being turned away at Haifa port on April 30.
This weblog publish offers an evaluation of the continued dispute between Israel and Ukraine and the underlying authorized points. To this finish, it should first give an outline of the systematic apply by Russian authorities to reap grain within the occupied Ukrainian territories and promote it on worldwide markets. Then, it should look at the diplomatic dispute between the international locations extra intently earlier than providing a authorized evaluation.
The systematic appropriation of Ukrainian grain by Russia
Throughout their preliminary assault within the spring of 2022, Russian forces occupied vital swaths of territory within the east and southeast of Ukraine. Shortly thereafter, Russian authorities started to take management of the agricultural sector in these areas. To this finish, the property of main Ukrainian agricultural firms corresponding to Nibulon or Agroton was confiscated and transferred both to Russian non-public companies or to public entities just like the newly established “State Grain Operator” in Zaporizhzhia oblast. Small-scale farmers who didn’t flee have been principally allowed to maintain their properties however at the moment are being compelled to promote their produce beneath market worth to Russian state-owned distributors. The crops farmed on this land are then exported by Russian commerce and logistics firms by way of the occupied ports in Mariupol, Berdiyansk, and Sevastopol. An in depth report on these schemes has been compiled by the Worldwide Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR). The IPHR report additionally factors out that the Ukrainian grain so exported is continuously shipped to Türkiye, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and varied African international locations.
The (alleged) import of grain from occupied Ukraine into Israel
In contrast to the international locations talked about above, Israel was, up till just lately, not recognized to be an importer of grain from occupied Ukraine. Whereas the IPHR report mentions a purported cargo to Israel by way of a grain terminal in Sevastopol in 2023, it’s not totally clear whether or not that cargo truly arrived in Israel or was rerouted to Türkiye (see p. 34 of the report). This modified, nonetheless, when the Abinsk docked on the port of Haifa on April 12. After the details about the arrival of the Russian bulk-carrier in Israel was made public, the Ukrainian authorities formally protested.
The dispute escalated when one other vessel allegedly carrying grain from the occupied areas, the Panamanian-flagged Panoramitis, arrived in Haifa in late April. Ukrainian Overseas Minister Andrii Sybiha criticized Israel’s lack of measures in opposition to the vessels, claiming that Ukraine had requested authorized help from Israel on this regard as early as April 15. This led to each side buying and selling diplomatic barbs over the problem, with Israeli Overseas Minister Gideon Saar claiming that Israel had obtained no formal request for help and no supporting proof from the Ukrainian facet. For its half, Ukraine summoned the Israeli ambassador and threatened financial sanctions in opposition to these concerned within the grain commerce. The Panoramitis in the end departed with out unloading the grain after Israeli importer Zenziper, apparently spooked by the diplomatic quarrel wherein it was unexpectedly caught, refused to simply accept the cargo (the affair has been lined extensively by Deutsche Welle).
The authorized state of affairs with respect to the occupied territories
As shouldn’t be uncommon in a diplomatic dispute, each Ukraine and Israel have couched their arguments in authorized terminology, apparently trying to bolster their respective positions in doing so. This consists of Ukrainian President Zelensky, who contended on X that “[i]n any regular nation, buying stolen items is an act that entails authorized legal responsibility. This is applicable, particularly, to grain stolen by Russia.” To find out the validity of this assertion, we should first look at Russia’s actions in Ukraine by way of the lens of worldwide legislation.
Russia’s ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine constitutes an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Constitution. Its assertion of sovereignty over the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts, which is predicated on sham referendums performed in September of 2022, quantities to an unlawful annexation. The identical is true for Crimea, the place the port of Sevastopol is positioned. The peninsula was annexed by Russia as early as 2014, following the same sham referendum. Nothing about these assessments is controversial. They’ve been confirmed by the UN Normal Meeting on a number of events (relating to the annexation of Crimea, see A/RES/68/262 of 27 March 2014; relating to the characterization of the Russian full-scale invasion as aggression, see A/RES/ES-11/1 of two March 2022; relating to the annexation of the Japanese Ukrainian oblasts, see A/RES/ES-11/4 of 12 October 2022).
Moreover, the territories in query are topic to the legislation of belligerent occupation as enshrined within the 1907 Hague Rules and the Fourth Geneva Conference. The ICJ has repeatedly acknowledged that the foundations on occupation contained in Articles 42 et seq. of the Hague Rules mirror customary worldwide legislation (see Development of a Wall within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion (2004), paras 78, 89; Armed Actions (DR Congo v. Uganda), Deserves (2005), para 172). The confiscation of personal property in occupied territory is explicitly prohibited by Article 46 of the Hague Rules. Furthermore, insofar because the Russian measures have an effect on Ukrainian state-owned property, they violate the responsibility of the occupying state to conduct itself merely because the administrator and usufructuary of public agricultural estates, as enshrined in Article 55. The massive-scale harvesting and export of crops farmed on such lands for revenue clearly exceeds the boundaries of what an inexpensive usufructuary could be allowed to do beneath this provision. Moreover, the IPHR report concludes that the widespread appropriation of agricultural properties within the territories involved quantities to pillage, which is prohibited beneath Article 47 of the Hague Rules and, beneath Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the Rome Statute, constitutes a battle crime (see IPHR report, p. 39).
Authorized penalties for grain-importing states, together with Israel
Having discovered that each Russia’s assertion of sovereignty over the occupied Ukrainian territories and its measures to take management of the agricultural sector there are unlawful beneath public worldwide legislation, we are able to now proceed to look at the results of those actions for states that import or have imported grain from the occupied territories, together with Israel.
The characterization of Russia’s takeovers of Crimea and the Japanese Ukrainian oblasts as unlawful annexations issues. Underneath the customary precept broadly often known as the Stimson Doctrine, which is enshrined in Article 41(2) of the Articles on the Duty of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), all states are obligated to not acknowledge annexations and different severe breaches of peremptory norms of worldwide legislation. This obligation doesn’t exhaust itself in an obligation to abstain from formally acknowledging Russia’s declare to sovereignty over the territories involved. Slightly, it entails a complete responsibility to not acknowledge official acts carried out by the aggressor on the occupied territory (see ICJ, Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, Advisory Opinion (1971), para 125) and to forestall commerce and funding relations that might help the aggressor in sustaining management over the territory (see ICJ, Insurance policies and Practices of Israel within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion (2024), para 278). These duties arising from the non-recognition precept are supposed to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. They’d proceed to bind the worldwide group even within the occasion that Ukraine is ultimately compelled to signal a “unhealthy peace” that permits Russia to keep up a presence within the areas involved (as I defined right here).
The commerce in stolen grain helps Russia to boost income and proceed each its battle of aggression and the unlawful occupation. Furthermore, the appropriation of this grain by Russia was itself unlawful, because it was carried out in violation of worldwide humanitarian legislation as laid down within the Hague Rules. Therefore, it can’t be argued that buying such grain from Russia advantages the inhabitants of the occupied territories, which might exempt the commerce from the non-recognition precept beneath the so-called Namibia Exception. Subsequently, the non-recognition precept is greatest understood as requiring different states to not import this grain. This responsibility applies routinely, no matter whether or not the state that has fallen sufferer to the annexation or occupation in query has formally requested authorized help. Any violation quantities to an internationally wrongful act that offers the injured state the suitable to take proportionate countermeasures—together with financial sanctions—as laid down in Articles 22 and 49 et seq. of the ARSIWA. Thus, President Zelensky’s declare that “buying stolen items is an act that entails authorized legal responsibility” is appropriate even in worldwide legislation—no less than so far as these items originate in annexed or illegally occupied areas.
Nevertheless, with respect to the grain delivered to Haifa by the Abinsk, there may be a catch. Within the Advisory Opinions that elaborate on the non-recognition precept, the ICJ didn’t specify whether or not the duties arising thereunder represent obligations of outcome or obligations of conduct (a distinction that the Courtroom has acknowledged repeatedly, most just lately in its Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Local weather Change (2025), para 175). Nevertheless, the language the Courtroom used within the 2024 Advisory Opinion on the Occupied Palestinian Territory signifies that no less than the responsibility to forestall commerce and funding relations is a mere obligation of conduct (see para 278, “take steps to forestall […]”). Subsequently, whether it is true that Israel was not equipped with adequate details about the grain carried by the Abinsk, its failure to forestall the import of this grain doubtless doesn’t quantity to a violation of the non-recognition precept. Thus, to present enamel to the non-recognition precept, Ukraine could also be required to distribute related data and draw different states’ consideration to such illicit commerce.
Authorized penalties for third events
The non-recognition precept shouldn’t be solely related to grain-importing states. Worldwide commerce is an affair that requires a large number of various companies, together with delivery, financing, insurance coverage, and generally transshipment. In different phrases, such commerce shouldn’t be merely a bilateral affair between the exporting and the importing state, and repair suppliers from a lot of international locations could also be concerned. The truth that the Panoramitis was crusing beneath the flag of Panama when it made port in Haifa highlights this. If the responsibility to forestall commerce relations that might help an aggressor in sustaining management over an illegally occupied territory requires states to abstain from importing grain from that territory, the responsibility should additionally require states to not facilitate such illicit commerce by permitting delivery strains, insurance coverage businesses, banks, and many others. inside their jurisdiction to take part in it.
Alternatively, an obligation to forestall such participation in commerce that violates the non-recognition precept may come up from the customary obligation to not assist or help one other state within the fee of an internationally wrongful act, as mirrored in Article 16 ARSIWA (see ICJ, Utility of the Genocide Conference (Bosnia v. Serbia), Deserves, para.420). Nevertheless, Article 16(a) ARSIWA explicitly offers that rendering such assist or help to a different state solely entails legal responsibility when the aiding state acted with information of the circumstances of the wrongful act. Thus, the provision of details about the origin of the traded grain would once more be of essential significance.
Conclusions
It’s not clear from the general public alternate between the governments of Ukraine and Israel whether or not Israel or another state had obtained data on the freight carried by the Abinsk earlier than the vessel was unloaded within the port of Haifa. If it didn’t, Israel’s failure to forestall the unloading and the additional transport of the grain doubtless didn’t violate the non-recognition precept. Neither did the potential failure of third states to forestall the participation of their nationals within the conduct of this commerce. Nevertheless, with respect to doable future shipments of illegally harvested Ukrainian grain, the state of affairs could be totally different if Ukraine provides enough data upfront. That is extremely related, as the primary purpose why the Panoramitis in the end left Israel with enterprise unfinished appears to be the reluctance of its buying and selling companion. Subsequently, to keep away from incurring worldwide legal responsibility and exposing itself to Ukrainian sanctions sooner or later, Israel—simply as another state—could be nicely suggested to train due diligence in its commerce relations with Russia.
Picture credit score: Eldar Eldadi CC BY-SA 4.0
