I. Introduction
Reciprocity might be one of the crucial mentioned necessities within the area of the popularity and enforcement of international judgments. Whereas its legitimacy seems to be on the wane (see Béligh Elbalti, “Reciprocity and the Recognition and Enforcement of International Judgments: A Lot of Bark however Not A lot Chunk,” 13 JPIL 1 (2017) 184), reciprocity can nonetheless strike exhausting – notably when it’s utilized loosely and with out ample consideration.
The case introduced right here, determined by the Egyptian Supreme Court docket (Attraction No. 11434 of 21 June 2025), offers a very good illustration. Regardless of the Court docket’s well-established case regulation imposing sure restrictions on using the reciprocity requirement, this latest judgment exhibits that, when not utilized with the required rigor, reciprocity can nonetheless produce vital results that undermine the legit expectations of the events.
II. Details
The case involved the enforcement of a Canadian divorce judgment rendered in Quebec, ordering the appellant (Y) to pay a specified sum of cash with curiosity.
X, in whose favor the judgment was issued, sought to have the Canadian judgment enforced in Egypt. The Court docket of First Occasion rejected the declare. X then appealed to the Court docket of Attraction, which overturned the first-instance judgment and ordered the enforcement of the Canadian determination.
Dissatisfied with this consequence, Y introduced an attraction earlier than the Supreme Court docket.
In assist of his attraction, Y argued that the Court docket of Attraction had ordered the enforcement of the Canadian judgment with out establishing the existence of any laws in Canada allowing the enforcement of Egyptian judgments there, as required below Article 296.
III. The Ruling (Abstract)
It’s established within the case regulation of this Court docket that Article 296 of the Code of Civil Process makes clear that the rule is based on the precept of reciprocity or mutual remedy. Accordingly, international judgments in Egypt should obtain the identical remedy that Egyptian judgments obtain within the international nation whose judgment is sought to be enforced. On this respect, the legislature restricted the requirement to legislative reciprocity and didn’t require diplomatic reciprocity established by treaty or conference. The court docket should confirm the existence of legislative reciprocity by itself initiative.
Within the current case, the Court docket of Attraction ordered the enforcement of the Canadian determination on the idea {that a} international judgment could also be relied upon earlier than Egyptian courts as long as no Egyptian judgment between the identical events on the identical matter has been issued and change into enforceable, with out figuring out whether or not any conference exists between Egypt and Canada in regards to the enforcement of judgments that gives for reciprocity, as required below Article 296 of the Code of Civil Process.
This constitutes a violation of the regulation and requires that the judgment be quashed and the case remanded.
IV. Feedback
The Court docket’s determination raises vital issues.
First, the Supreme Court docket seems to contradict itself. After reiterating its longstanding place that “diplomatic reciprocity” – that’s, reciprocity established by a treaty – just isn’t required below Egyptian regulation, it however held that reciprocity with Canada was not established as a result of the Court docket of Attraction didn’t decide whether or not any conference with Canada exists. This isn’t the primary time the Court docket has adopted such reasoning. In a earlier case determined in 2015, the Supreme Court docket relied on an analogous strategy when evaluating the enforcement of a Palestinian judgment (Attraction No. 16894 of 4 June 2015). Such reasoning is tough to reconcile with the Court docket’s personal affirmation that treaty-based reciprocity is irrelevant below Article 296.
Second, the Court docket’s ruling is inconsistent not solely with the prevailing view within the literature (for an summary, see Karim El Chazli, “Recognition and Enforcement of International Choices in Egypt,” 15 YBPIL (2013/2014) 400–401), but in addition with the Court docket’s prior stance affirming reciprocity on the idea of “legislative reciprocity”. Below this strategy, reciprocity exists if, in line with the enforcement regulation of the State of origin, Egyptian judgments could be enforceable there. Certainly, in earlier circumstances, the Court docket carried out a comparative evaluation of the enforcement necessities below the regulation of the State of origin and below Egyptian regulation, and concluded that reciprocity was glad when the 2 units of necessities have been broadly comparable (see, e.g., Attraction No. 1136 of 28 November 1990, admitting reciprocity with Yemen; Attraction No. 633 of 26 February 2011 and Attraction No. 3940 of 15 June 2020, each admitting reciprocity with Palestine). As well as, in some circumstances involving the popularity or enforcement of judgments rendered in a rustic with which Egypt has not concluded any worldwide conference, the Supreme Court docket didn’t look at the difficulty of reciprocity as required below Article 296 of the Code of Civil Process, nor did it invoke it sua sponte because the Court docket has repeatedly affirmed. As a substitute, it instantly examined the necessities for recognition or enforcement below the circumstances laid down in Article 298 of the Code of Civil Process (see, e.g., Attraction No. 2014 of 20 March 2003 concerning the enforcement of a New Jersey judgment ordering the fee of damages ensuing from breach of contract; Appeals No. 62 and 106 of 25 Could 1993 concerning the popularity of a Californian divorce judgment. In each circumstances, nevertheless, recognition and enforcement have been rejected, inter alia, on the bottom of public coverage).
Third, the Court docket’s stance on this case is more likely to create extra issues than it solves. Even setting apart the contradiction famous above, the Court docket gave no indication on how “legislative reciprocity” ought to be established when the international judgment originates from a federated province or a state inside a federal system, every having its personal autonomous authorized regime (on the problem of building reciprocity emanating from federal states, notably america, see Béligh Elbalti, “La Réciprocité en matière de réception des décisions étrangères en droit worldwide privé tunisien – observations critiques de la décision de la Cour d’appel de Tunis n°37565 du 31 janvier 2013” 256/257 Infos Juridiques (mars-2018) 20 (Half I), 258/259, Infos Juridiques (avril-2018) 18 (Half II)).
The scenario of Canada is especially putting. In Quebec, the place a civil-law strategy prevails within the area of personal worldwide regulation, the principles on the popularity and enforcement of international judgments are comprehensively codified (see Gérald Goldstein, “The Recognition and Enforcement of International Choices in Québec,” 15 YBPIL (2013/2014) 291) and differ considerably from these relevant within the common-law provinces (see Geneviève Saumier, “Recognition and Enforcement of International Judgments in Canadian Frequent Regulation Provinces,” 15 YBPIL (2013/2014) 313). If the Court docket insists on making use of the criterion of “legislative reciprocity,” how are Egyptian courts to evaluate reciprocity in relation to a province corresponding to Quebec? Wouldn’t it be ample that Egyptian judgments are enforceable in one other Canadian province the place enforcement is ruled by common-law ideas? Does it matter that, within the common-law provinces, recognition and enforcement are usually not codified and are largely primarily based on case regulation? And if, as could be anticipated, “legislative reciprocity” needed to be established by reference to Quebec regulation, would it not be related that below Quebec regulation, reciprocity just isn’t a requirement for the popularity and enforcement of international judgments in any respect? On this respect, Egyptian courts could be effectively suggested to think about the beneficiant strategy adopted in Tunisia, whereby the Supreme Court docket established a presumption in favor of reciprocity, inserting the burden on the celebration difficult enforcement to show its non-existence (for particulars, see Béligh Elbalti, “La réciprocité en matière d’exequatur?: Quoi de nouveau?? Observations sous l’arrêt de la Cour de cassation n° 6608 du 13 mars 2014”printed in Arab Regulation Quarterly (2025) as an online-first publication. For an summary from a comparative perspective within the MENA Arab jurisdictions, see Béligh Elbalti, “Perspective from the Arab World”, in M. Weller et al. (eds.), The HCCH 2019 Jugements Conference – Cornerstones, Prospects; Outlook (Hart, 2023) 193-194).
Lastly, this case, together with a number of others in regards to the enforcement of international judgments, illustrates the problem of imposing such judgments in Egypt within the absence of an relevant treaty (for latest examples, see Attraction No. 25178 of 17 November 2024, which rejected the enforcement of an Irish judgment on the bottom of public coverage, and Attraction No. 3493 of 4 December 2024, which rejected the enforcement of an Austrian judgment as a result of the varied circumstances laid down in Article 298 weren’t glad. Against this, the place a bilateral conference exists, enforcement is considerably typically simpler (see, e.g., Attraction No. 200 of 14 Could 2005, which allowed the enforcement of a French custody judgment pursuant to the bilateral conference between the 2 international locations; however contra, Attraction No. 719 of 8 October 2013, which rejected the enforcement of an analogous French judgment).
It should be admitted, nevertheless, that the conclusion of such a conference doesn’t essentially assure smoother enforcement (see, as an illustration, my earlier feedback on the enforcement of judgments rendered in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, obtainable on this Weblog right here and right here).
