In the latest episode of Israeli assaults on Iran, on Monday, 16 June 2025, Israeli forces struck the headquarters of the Iranian state broadcaster in Tehran. In a submit on X, the Israeli Defence Minister instantly claimed duty, stating
‘The propaganda and incitement broadcasting authority of the Iranian regime was attacked by the IDF […]. We are going to defeat the Iranian dictator in all places.’
This assertion implies that the broadcasting studio was thought of a reliable goal. Whereas this may align with Clausewitz’s view that the enemy’s morale is a reliable navy goal, it raises the query of whether or not such an interpretation is legitimate below trendy worldwide regulation. Briefly, it isn’t – at the very least not except the studio is deemed to pose an imminent navy menace or is meant for navy use, or is immediately inciting severe crimes below worldwide regulation.
The Safety of Journalists below Worldwide Humanitarian Legislation
Essentially the most related rules on the safety of individuals in armed battle are discovered within the 4 Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Further Protocols. As a part of worldwide humanitarian regulation, their applicability begins as quickly as an armed battle exists. No matter one’s view on the legality of using drive ab initio, it’s evident that Israel and Iran are presently concerned in a global armed battle. This submit is predicated on this premise.
Of the 4 Geneva Conventions of 1949 solely Article 4(A)(4) of the Third Geneva Conference relative to the Remedy of Prisoners of Conflict addresses media personnel. This text extends the protections afforded to prisoners of battle within the case of seize to battle correspondents accompanying armed forces. Given the restricted safety for journalists vis-à-vis their very important societal function in reporting on armed conflicts, the UN Normal Meeting in 1970 handed a decision calling for enhanced safety of journalists below IHL. This led to the adoption of a draft Worldwide Conference on the Safety of Journalists Engaged in Harmful Missions by the UN Financial and Social Committee – although it was by no means ratified. Nonetheless, it influenced the inclusion of such provision in Article 79 of the Further Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I), which supplies that journalists should be thought of civilians and, as such, are entitled to full safety. The content material of this provision was reaffirmed by UN Safety Council Decision 1783 and is now considered customary worldwide regulation.
The Scope of Safety Awarded
Article 79 of AP I doesn’t outline the time period ‘journalist’. Nevertheless, Article 2(a) of the aforementioned draft conference helps make clear this, defining a journalist as any ‘correspondent, reporter, photographer, movie cameraman or press technician who has that standing by advantage of their nation’s regulation or follow.’ This yields a broad definition. Moreover, Article 79 of AP I requires that journalists be engaged in a ‘harmful skilled mission within the space of armed battle’ – a time period that covers typical journalistic actions performed in an space affected by hostilities: conducting interviews, recording, or transmitting supplies to the general public.
If these situations are met, journalists take pleasure in the identical safety as civilians below Article 50 of AP I. They need to not be indiscriminately focused, and all possible measures should be taken to make sure their security. This stays true, even when a journalist is embedded with the armed forces, accompanies armed forces or takes benefit of their logistic assist. Beneath Article 52 of AP I, this safety additionally extends to tools utilized by journalists, supplied these are thought of civilian in nature. In case of doubt, the presumption of Article 52(3) of AP I applies. Thus, the safety covers cameras, broadcasting tools, in addition to broadcasting amenities.
Exemptions to the Rule
Israel’s characterisation of the Iranian broadcaster as a ‘propaganda and incitement machine’ raises the authorized query of when such amenities could lawfully be focused for disseminating propagandist materials. And certainly, a limitation arises when Article 79(1) of AP I is learn along with Article 51(3) of AP I: if a civilian – extra particularly, a journalist – takes a direct half in hostilities, their safety ceases. An identical studying applies to journalists’ tools below Article 52(2) of AP I, the place safety ends if the thing is used for navy functions.
It should thus be assessed when a journalist’s actions represent ‘direct participation’ in hostilities or whether or not media amenities are getting used for navy goals – and particularly, whether or not propagandistic actions meet this threshold. The definition of navy goals in Article 52(2) requires that the thing, by its nature, location, function, or use, makes an efficient contribution to navy motion and that its destruction affords a particular navy benefit. This excessive normal isn’t met by media amenities. Conceivable circumstances embody dual-use situations, reminiscent of utilizing TV transmitters for navy communications or repurposing the constructing as navy command submit.
In evaluating propagandistic materials, the ICTY’s Ultimate Report back to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Assessment the NATO Bombing Marketing campaign In opposition to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia affords steering. In contemplating the legality of NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavian TV stations, the report said that whether or not media constitutes a reliable goal is debatable and concluded that disseminating propaganda to assist a battle effort is just not adequate by itself. Nevertheless, the report left open the chance that if media types the ‘central nervous system’ sustaining a regime and perpetuating battle, it is perhaps thought of a reliable navy goal. However, the ICTY in the end reaffirmed the overarching authorized normal of AP I for assaults on civilians and civilian objects, specifically that an assault should successfully contribute to navy operations and supply a particular navy benefit. Whereas propagandistic messages can bolster civilian morale, they often fail to fulfill this criterion – a conclusion that runs counter to Clausewitz’s assertion. Due to this fact, this exception can virtually below all circumstances be thought of factually irrelevant.
Nevertheless, the ICTY famous one last exception, impartial of navy goals: when the media explicitly incites the fee of great crimes below worldwide regulation. Particularly, it cited using the media through the Rwandan genocide of 1994 for example, referring to the Rwandan Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), which performed a elementary function in inciting the violence that in the end led to the genocide. Nevertheless, that is an excessive and exceptionally slender situation. Propagandistic content material alone doesn’t meet this normal.
Conclusion
Thus, the safety afforded to journalists and media broadcasters below IHL is powerful, and any exceptions to this safety should be interpreted strictly. In opposition to this backdrop, the Israeli Defence Minister’s justification doesn’t stand as much as authorized scrutiny. In comparison with RTLM through the Rwandan genocide, which explicitly incited mass violence and genocide, the Iranian broadcaster’s output, nevertheless antisemitic and hostile it could be, doesn’t meet the authorized threshold for lack of safety from this angle.
Except Israel can show that the broadcaster was additionally used for navy functions the strike should be thought of incompatible with IHL. Merely labelling a media outlet as a propagandist arm of the state doesn’t render it a lawful navy goal.
