On 11 June 2025, Colombian President Gustavo Petro issued Decree 639, calling a nationwide in style session on a package deal of long-stalled social reforms. The decree got here after the Senate had explicitly rejected his formal request to carry such a vote – approval that’s constitutionally required underneath Article 104 of the Structure.
In doing so, Petro positioned himself as a guardian of constitutional order, even whereas violating certainly one of its core procedural necessities and unilaterally assuming a perform reserved for the judiciary. This double encroachment reveals one thing deeper and extra harmful: an more and more Schmittian conception of democratic energy, wherein the president, claiming to symbolize a unified individuals, overrides institutional checks within the identify of upper constitutional constancy.
A sovereign past constitutional constraints
President Petro’s current actions are formed by a conception of energy that echoes the constitutional idea of Carl Schmitt: the concept the sovereign can rise above authorized constraints in moments of exception, and that the president is liable for discerning its will, has been invoked throughout his administration.
After the Senate denied his request to carry a session, Petro insisted that this alleged “spurious” resolution couldn’t forestall the sovereign from deciding. Petro’s decree didn’t merely ignore the Senate; it declared that the best way wherein the Senate had denied the request was itself unconstitutional, citing a number of procedural irregularities that, in his view, voided the chamber’s resolution. On that foundation, the president claimed that, by advantage of the mandate granted to him by the constituent energy, he had an obligation to guard the Structure.
In doing so, Petro asserted not simply political disagreement however authorized superiority. In his telling, the institutional blockade is illegitimate, and the president is duty-bound to take away it with the intention to restore the constitutional order. This controversial position of the president as a guardian of the Structure by the disapplication of a Senate vote marks a brand new section. It means that the chief now claims a quasi-constitutional evaluate energy, additional consolidating authority not solely over the legislature however over constitutional interpretation itself.
This imaginative and prescient expands even additional when one appears on the language Petro has used to justify his stance. He usually invokes “the individuals” as a homogeneous, virtuous topic – these dedicated to his transformative agenda. Critics and dissenters, against this, are described not as reliable members in democratic debate, however as enemies of reform and, by extension, enemies of the individuals. Opponents have been publicly labeled as mafiosos, Nazis, vampires or rats. Residents who protest have been equally denounced, and the President has categorized them as victimarios – a time period that denotes perpetrators of hurt. In a number of of those situations, the judiciary has ordered Petro to situation corrections to those statements.
In Petro’s view, a real consultant of the individuals should heed and observe their voice, and that voice, he argues, takes priority over institutional concerns. Petro allegedly not solely has appealed on to the individuals, but additionally has considerably recognized himself because the interpreter of their will. This framing – of a unified in style will as interpreted by the president versus its inside enemies – corresponds to Schmitt’s personal friend-enemy distinction. It collapses pluralism and legitimizes rule by government resolution, not regulation. It casts institutional disagreement as betrayal and turns constitutional friction into existential battle. And the President, on this view, can be in control of decoding the desire of the individuals and guarding it towards formal legality.
The Colombian authorized framework
To grasp the gravity of the scenario, some context is important. Colombia’s 1991 Structure embraces a participatory democratic mannequin that integrates each consultant and direct democracy. Residents elect representatives to deliberate and legislate on their behalf, however they might additionally take part straight in sure selections by mechanisms reminiscent of referenda, constituent assemblies, and in style consultations. These devices have been designed to not exchange consultant establishments, however to enrich and refine them, particularly in contexts the place conventional illustration might fall in need of capturing the complexity of social calls for.
Importantly, direct democracy in Colombia will not be unbound. It operates inside a constitutional framework that topics it to clear guidelines and procedural safeguards, exactly to make sure its legitimacy and forestall plebiscitary or populist misuse. Mechanisms like in style consultations should be approved by the Senate underneath Article 104 of the Structure. This authorization will not be merely a proper requirement, however quite permits for democratic deliberation over the framing, scope, and timing of such initiatives. Legislative approval helps be sure that direct citizen participation is channeled institutionally, quite than used as a software to bypass consultant democracy altogether.
President Petro initially adopted this path when he submitted a proper request to the Senate, which was debated and finally denied on 14 Could. In response, he then bypassed this resolution and issued a decree, asserting that procedural flaws within the Senate’s vote rendered its final result unconstitutional.
Underneath Colombian constitutional regulation, each judges and public officers might train what is named excepción de inconstitucionalidad: the ability to disapply sub-constitutional norms once they clearly battle with the Structure, however solely with inter partes results. This decentralized mannequin of evaluate, harking back to the U.S. system, applies solely when the contradiction is manifest. However right here, no such contradiction is obvious. The requirement of Senate approval in Article 104 is obvious, and the legislative course of was adopted. Extra importantly, there may be near-unanimous consensus amongst constitutional students from a wide range of views in addition to amongst NGOs, that the President can’t unilaterally summon a well-liked session or determine on the validity of the Senate’s selections (see right here, right here, right here, right here, and right here).
Amidst this battle, Petro strikingly declared that he was keen to repeal the decree provided that Congress handed a regulation containing the factors he sought to pursue by the session. Congress complied, and on 24 June 2025 he repealed the decree. This made the chief’s compliance with the Structure conditional on legislative acquiescence to presidential priorities – an strategy that positioned political will above constitutional obligation.
Judicial firewalls
Some days earlier than the decree was repealed, the Nationwide Civil Registry (Colombia’s electoral authority in control of organizing elections and in style consultations) had already introduced that it will not transfer ahead with organizing the vote for the favored session till the courts rule on the legality of the presidential decree. The Registrar Normal emphasised that figuring out the constitutionality of the decree (particularly in laborious instances reminiscent of this one) is a matter for the judiciary, not the electoral authorities. This resolution dealt a big blow to the federal government’s technique. In response, the president asserted that the choice was seditious.
With the Registry stepping apart, the accountability shifted totally to the courts. On 18 June 2025 (previous to the decree’s repeal), the Council of State suspended the consequences of the decree whereas it reaches a ultimate resolution on its validity. Petro publicly declared that the ruling was disrespectful to his rights as president, rights that, he claimed, stem from the mandate given by nearly all of residents who voted for him. The Constitutional Courtroom, on its half, may develop into concerned, significantly if it revisits its prior precedent that permits evaluate solely after the session has taken place. Collectively, these judicial establishments type a community of constitutional guardians which will forestall the implementation of a decree that bypasses a core procedural safeguard.
Democratic erosion and the prospect of a constituent meeting
This standoff displays a permanent rigidity in constitutional idea. It’s a conflict between two visions: one wherein authorized type, process, and institutional stability generate legitimacy, and one other wherein the political will of the individuals – embodied in a single chief – claims the ability to override such constraints. The primary is a Kelsenian very best of legality (see right here, pp. 197 and 221-224), the second is Schmittian sovereignty. Whereas each logics might coexist, moments of disaster are inclined to push constitutional actors towards the latter, significantly in Latin America the place hyper-presidentialism stays a pervasive characteristic of political methods (see right here).
Though the federal government succeeded in enacting the regulation that contained the factors initially meant for public session, Petro’s Minister of Justice, Eduardo Montealegre, continues to champion the Schmittian strategy arguing that Colombia’s institutional “blockade” justifies convening a constituent meeting, as soon as once more, with out congressional approval. He means that institutional obstruction warrants radical change. Petro, on his half, has endorsed this view and proposed that the individuals determine – by a well-liked vote held alongside the following basic elections, presumably in 2026 – whether or not to provoke the method.
Nonetheless, this reasoning not solely stretches constitutional guidelines; it additionally disregards express constitutional mandates as soon as extra. Article 376 of the Structure states {that a} constituent meeting can solely be convened with prior approval from Congress. To disregard this requirement will not be transformative: it’s legally insubordinate.
This sequence of actions doesn’t quantity to a coup or dictatorship. Nevertheless it does illustrate what students name democratic erosion: the sluggish however persistent undermining of institutional checks, constitutional norms, and the legitimacy of opposition.
Unwritten conventions and government energy
In presidential methods like Colombia’s, the place the chief already wields substantial authority, casual constitutional conventions play a significant position. These are unwritten norms of institutional restraint, reminiscent of deference to legislative selections, procedural loyalty, and political tolerance.
Petro’s technique threatens to dismantle these conventions. By treating the Senate’s resolution not merely as incorrect however legally void, he indicators that institutional disagreement is not going to be tolerated. His declare that he should defend the Structure by disregarding a constitutional process successfully redefines constitutionalism as alignment with presidential targets. This logic additionally underpins his resolution to name for a well-liked vote on whether or not to convene a constituent meeting (once more, with out congressional approval), regardless of the clear requirement of Article 376 on the contrary.
In the long term, this considering expands government authority – inside an already hyper-presidential regime that the Constitutional Courtroom has strived to tame previously – on the expense of democratic pluralism and authorized predictability.
What hangs within the stability
Colombia will not be going through quick authoritarian collapse. Its courts stay operational, elections are aggressive, and Congress continues to perform. However the nation is confronting a critical institutional rupture – one which exams the integrity of its constitutional framework.
President Petro’s transfer is a repudiation of the Structure’s core, that’s, a declare that legality should yield to presidentially outlined legitimacy. And it’s a warning signal that an already highly effective presidency could also be sliding towards discretionary sovereign rule.
Whether or not this second accelerates or comprises Colombia’s democratic backsliding will rely upon how electoral authorities, judges, and civil society reply. At stake will not be solely the way forward for Petro’s agenda, however the way forward for constitutionalism in certainly one of Latin America’s most vibrant constitutional democracies.
