This submit summarizes the printed prison opinions from the North Carolina Courtroom of Appeals launched on March 5, 2025. These summaries will likely be added to Smith’s Legal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the current.
Second trial decide didn’t have authority to enter order denying movement to dismiss when listening to was held and ruling was rendered by earlier trial decide who retired earlier than entry of the order.
State v. Fearns, COA23-650, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 5, 2025). For extra in-depth dialogue of this case, see this submit by Prof. Shea Denning. On this Granville County case, defendant appealed her conviction for embezzlement, arguing that the trial courtroom lacked authority to enter the order denying her movement to dismiss as a result of it was not issued by the superior courtroom decide who held the listening to. The Courtroom of Appeals vacated the trial courtroom’s order denying Defendant’s movement and remanded the matter for a brand new listening to on the movement.
In 2008, police started investigating defendant, an worker of a regulation agency, for allegedly embezzling roughly $50,000 from consumer belief funds. As a result of numerous problems, together with personnel adjustments and issue acquiring data, costs weren’t introduced till January 2019. Defendant moved to dismiss, alleging the delay prejudiced her as a result of unavailability of key paperwork. The trial decide who presided over the movement listening to in January 2020 orally denied it and requested the State to draft the order. This trial decide retired in October 2020. In September 2021, a brand new trial decide signed the order denying the movement to dismiss, with a notation that the order was issued by the earlier trial decide and a quotation to Rule 63 of the Guidelines of Civil Process. Defendant was subsequently convicted, and appealed.
The Courtroom of Appeals concluded the second trial decide didn’t have the authority to signal the order denying defendant’s movement to dismiss. As a result of Rule 63, which permits a decide to carry out the duties of one other decide underneath sure circumstances, applies solely to civil circumstances, “this concern shouldn’t be ruled by Rule 63.” Slip Op. at 10. The courtroom additionally famous that “[t]he Guidelines of Legal Process don’t handle the authority of 1 decide to enter an order on behalf of one other decide on this context,” and the State didn’t present every other authority in help. Id. at 11. Seeking to State v. Bartlett, 368 N.C. 309 (2015), the courtroom utilized the precept that “the decide who presided on the listening to should make the findings of reality.” Slip Op. at 12. As a result of the second trial decide right here didn’t have authority to enter the order denying defendant’s movement, the courtroom vacated her conviction and remanded for a brand new listening to on the movement.
Choose Stading concurred by separate opinion, emphasizing “a tempered software of State v. Bartlett” as that case targeted particularly on movement to suppress statutes. Id. at 14.
No error when seating a brand new potential juror from the jury pool, as jury was not but empaneled and potential members weren’t but categorized as jurors.
State v. Griffin, COA24-156, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 5, 2025). On this Mecklenburg County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree homicide and possession of a firearm by a felon, arguing the trial courtroom erred by seating a juror from the jury pool as a substitute of elevating one of many potential alternate jurors. The Courtroom of Appeals discovered no error.
Defendant was indicted for first-degree homicide, possession of a firearm by a felon, and conspiracy to commit theft with a harmful weapon associated to a 2018 armed theft. Throughout jury choice, twelve potential jurors have been chosen, in addition to two potential alternate jurors. Earlier than the jury was empaneled, potential Juror No. 7 was excused attributable to his spouse going into labor. The State argued {that a} new juror needs to be chosen from the jury pool underneath G.S. 15A-1214(g). Defendant argued that one of many potential alternate jurors ought to change Juror No. 7, after which a brand new alternate juror needs to be chosen. The trial courtroom agreed with the State, and a brand new potential juror was picked from the pool to exchange the departing juror. The jury was then empaneled and in the end discovered defendant responsible of first-degree homicide and possession of a firearm by a felon.
The Courtroom of Appeals defined the core of the query on enchantment as “whether or not these potential, yet-to-be members of the to-be empaneled jury who’ve been accepted by every celebration, are correctly categorized as jurors or alternate jurors.” Slip Op. at 8. The textual content of G.S. 15A-1215 governs when an alternate juror turns into a juror, however to correctly apply the statute on this scenario the courtroom was compelled to find out the right that means of “juror.” Referencing Garner’s Trendy English Utilization, the courtroom acknowledged {that a} “juror” is somebody who has been empaneled on the jury and distinguished this from a possible juror or veniremember who hasn’t but been chosen to sit down on the jury. Id. at 8. The courtroom held that G.S. 15A-1214(g) was controlling on this scenario, because it permitted the trial courtroom to substitute a brand new potential juror when a juror that has been accepted however not empaneled is challenged for trigger. Concluding the evaluation, the courtroom famous that since defendant didn’t argue or present prejudice on enchantment, his “contentions as to statutory error are overruled.” Id. at 12. Defendant additionally tried to argue that his constitutional proper to a good and neutral jury was infringed, however the courtroom held he didn’t protect this argument as he didn’t elevate it at trial.
Testimony from defendant’s psychologist didn’t set up the mitigating issue that his schizophrenia considerably lowered his culpability for the homicide.
State v. Rojas, COA24-690, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 5, 2025). On this Gaston County case, defendant appealed his aggravated sentence for second-degree homicide, arguing that the sentencing decide erred in failing to seek out the statutory mitigating issue that he was affected by a psychological or bodily situation that considerably lowered his culpability. The Courtroom of Appeals discovered no error.
This matter beforehand reached the Courtroom of Appeals within the unpublished State v. Rojas, No. COA20-810. Defendant murdered his girlfriend in Could 2016 by stabbing her over 100 occasions and leaving her to bleed to loss of life of their bathtub. He was initially discovered incompetent to face trial attributable to psychotic issues however later deemed competent after psychiatric care. On the resentencing listening to (the unique sentence having been vacated within the earlier enchantment), defendant offered testimony from a forensic psychiatrist who recognized him with schizophrenia. Nonetheless, the psychiatrist acknowledged he couldn’t testify with affordable medical certainty whether or not schizophrenia contributed to the violent habits on the time of the homicide. Defendant additionally testified, blaming remedy and hallucinations for his actions, however he provided no different professional testimony. The trial courtroom discovered two aggravating components (particularly heinous, atrocious, or merciless; and making the most of a place of belief) and three mitigating components (help system, constructive employment historical past, and good remedy prognosis), however in the end decided the irritating components outweighed the mitigating components, imposing an aggravated sentence.
On enchantment, defendant argued that the sentencing courtroom ignored the credible testimony of the forensic psychologist that he suffered from schizophrenia, and it contributed to his culpability for the crime. The Courtroom of Appeals disagreed, concluding that defendant couldn’t present “substantial, uncontradicted, and manifestly credible proof” of the mitigating issue as his “solely professional witness couldn’t, and didn’t, testify with affordable medical certainty that defendant’s schizophrenia contributed to the homicide or in any other case considerably lowered defendant’s culpability for the offense.” Slip Op. at 12. Due to this fact, the courtroom held that the sentencing decide didn’t err in declining to seek out the mitigating issue.
Testimony from police officer and forensic professional that substance seemed to be marijuana was correctly admitted and supported defendant’s convictions, regardless of lack of testing confirming substance was not hemp.
State v. Ruffin, COA24-276, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 5, 2025). On this Martin County case, defendant appealed his convictions for trafficking in heroin offenses, sale of marijuana, and supply of marijuana, arguing a number of errors associated to the trial courtroom’s admission of testimony relating to the identification of marijuana and errors in sentencing. The Courtroom of Appeals discovered no error.
In 2021, a confidential informant (CI) contacted defendant, looking for to purchase seven grams of fentanyl “and a few marijuana.” Slip Op. at 3. Defendant quoted costs for each, and the CI paid defendant and obtained two luggage of the substances. Defendant was arrested shortly after leaving the scene. At trial, the detective who labored with the CI testified based mostly on his coaching and expertise that the plant materials seemed to be marijuana. A forensic scientist from the state crime lab additionally testified in regards to the plant materials, concluding it was “plant materials belonging to the genus hashish containing tetrahydrocannabinol [THC].” Id. at 4. Nonetheless, she additionally testified that the lab lacked the power to differentiate between marijuana and hemp, and that it was potential the plant materials was hemp. Defendant requested and the trial courtroom offered a jury instruction stating that the time period marijuana doesn’t embody hemp or hemp merchandise. Defendant was subsequently convicted, and obtained consecutive sentences of 70 to 93 months for his offenses.
Taking over defendant’s arguments, the Courtroom of Appeals first addressed whether or not it was error to permit the detective to testify that the plant materials was marijuana as lay opinion testimony. As a result of defendant didn’t object to the testimony at trial, the Courtroom reviewed for plain error. Referencing earlier case regulation, the courtroom famous {that a} police officer skilled within the identification of marijuana could testify to his visible identification of proof as marijuana. Defendant pointed to State v. Ward, 364 N.C. 133 (2010), to argue that an officer’s visible identification is not dependable because the legalization of hemp. The Courtroom distinguished Ward, noting “the usual for lay opinion testimony underneath Rule 701— together with [the detective’s] testimony—is unchanged in gentle of Ward.” Slip Op. at 9. Subsequent caselaw additionally supported that “regulation enforcement officers should provide lay opinion testimony figuring out a substance as marijuana.” Id. Because of this, the courtroom discovered no error in admitting the testimony.
The courtroom utilized the identical plain error evaluation to the forensic professional’s testimony as defendant didn’t object to her testimony both. As a result of she was testifying as an professional underneath Rule 702, the courtroom appeared to State v. Abrams, 248 N.C. App. 639 (2016), to find out if the professional adopted dependable procedures for figuring out the substance as marijuana. The courtroom was glad that the professional adopted acceptable procedures as established by earlier caselaw, and located the testimony dependable underneath Rule 702, that means it was not error to confess her testimony.
Defendant additionally argued that it was error to disclaim his movement to dismiss as a result of the State didn’t present ample proof the substance was marijuana not hemp. The courtroom disagreed, pointing to the testimony of the detective and forensic professional mentioned above, as “our courts have constantly affirmed that testimony figuring out a substance as marijuana—from a regulation enforcement officer in addition to a forensic professional—is ample to take the matter to the jury.” Id. at 15.
Though the trial courtroom used the suitable sample jury instruction, together with an alteration particularly requested by defendant, defendant argued it was error to omit instruction that “marijuana has a Delta-9 THC content material in extra of 0.3%, whereas hemp has a Delta-9 THC content material of 0.3% or much less.” Id. at 18. Making use of the plain error customary once more, the courtroom discovered no error, because the courtroom held that the instruction given was an correct assertion of the regulation.
Lastly, the courtroom reached the sentencing points, the place defendant argued he was improperly sentenced for promoting and delivering marijuana in the identical transaction. The courtroom concluded that any error if it existed was innocent, as “the trial courtroom consolidated these convictions to run concurrently with the longer sentence for Trafficking in a Combination Containing Heroin by Transportation.” Id. at 20. Defendant additionally argued that the prosecutor provided improper data that influenced sentencing concerns, because the prosecutor referenced a sufferer who died and a pending loss of life by distribution cost towards defendant. Nonetheless, “the trial courtroom right here expressly rejected the prosecutor’s arguments relating to the separate costs on the File and affirmatively acknowledged that different costs can be thought of in separate proceedings,” that means there was no proof that defendant obtained a sentence based mostly on improper data. Id. at 25.
Assault with a lethal weapon inflicting critical harm could function the predicate for felony homicide when defendant acted with precise intent to commit the act forming the idea of the homicide cost; G.S. 20-166 is ambiguous relating to the unit of prosecution, main the courtroom to use the rule of lenity and conclude the unit is per crash, not per sufferer.
State v. Watlington, COA23-1106, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 5, 2025). On this Guilford County case, two defendants, Watlington and Felton, each appealed from judgments entered after a trial the place the defendants have been tried collectively. Watlington was convicted of first-degree homicide and extra felonies associated to her makes an attempt to run over a number of individuals at a fuel station after a combat. Felton was convicted of 11 counts of accent after the actual fact to Watlington’s convictions. The Courtroom of Appeals arrested judgment on three of Watlington’s convictions for hit and run and three of Felton’s convictions for accent after the actual fact to hit and run, however discovered no error with the opposite convictions, remanding for resentencing.
One early morning in October of 2019, Felton drove an SUV to a fuel station in Greensboro, with Watlington as a passenger. After hitting a parked automotive, a confrontation ensued between Watlington, Felton, and the automotive’s proprietor. The argument escalated right into a brawl involving a number of individuals over the course of twenty-five minutes, and testimony confirmed Felton was the first aggressor. Round thirty minutes after the confrontation started, Watlington acquired into the motive force’s seat of the SUV and backed over a gaggle of individuals; it took her roughly ten seconds to utterly run over the victims. After stopping utterly away from the victims, Watlington drove ahead, working over the identical group of individuals at full pace. Felton watched the whole incident with out stopping Watlington, then stood over the victims yelling at them. One sufferer died on the scene, and a number of other others sustained critical accidents. The 2 defendants drove away within the SUV however have been apprehended close by a short while later.
The Courtroom of Appeals took up Watlington’s arguments on enchantment first, starting along with her argument that it was error for assault with a lethal weapon inflicting critical harm to be the predicate felony for her first-degree homicide conviction. In State v. Jones, 353 N.C. 159 (1994), the Supreme Courtroom held that “[f]or assault with a lethal weapon inflicting critical harm to function the predicate felony for a felony homicide conviction . . . the person should have acted with a ‘degree of intent higher than culpable negligence.’” Slip Op. at 11 (quoting Jones at 167). Right here, Watlington argued that Jones represented a “bright-line rule” that assault with a lethal weapon inflicting critical harm may by no means be a predicate felony, an argument the courtroom rejected. Id. As an alternative, the courtroom defined that “assault with a lethal weapon inflicting critical harm, as a matter of regulation, can function the predicate felony for a felony homicide conviction when the defendant acts with the ‘precise intent to commit the act that kinds the idea of [the] first-degree homicide cost.’” Id. at 13 (quoting Jones at 166). The trial courtroom correctly instructed the jury on this case, and the courtroom famous that ample proof supported the conclusion that Watlington acted deliberately when driving over the victims with the SUV. The courtroom additionally rejected Watlington’s problem to the jury instruction for felony homicide and the shortage of an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, discovering no errors within the instruction given and no proof to help a further voluntary manslaughter instruction.
The courtroom subsequent thought of Watlington’s argument relating to her a number of hit and run counts, and agreed that the construction of the statute didn’t help all of the convictions. G.S. 20-166 “doesn’t make clear whether or not its unit of prosecution is the conduct of leaving the scene of a crash or the variety of victims injured because of the crash,” leading to an ambiguity for the courtroom to resolve. Id. at 18. Right here the courtroom utilized the rule of lenity, decoding the paradox in Watlington’s favor. The courtroom defined that there have been 5 victims, however solely two crashes, one when Watlington backed over the victims and the second when Watlington drove ahead over the victims. Because of this, Watlington may solely be convicted twice, “one conviction for Watlington’s conduct of leaving the scene of every crash,” and the courtroom arrested judgment on the opposite three hit and run convictions. Id. at 21.
Arriving at Felton’s arguments, the courtroom first allotted along with her argument that there was inadequate proof to help her convictions for accent after the actual fact. Right here, proof confirmed that Felton watched Watlington hit the victims with the SUV, then left the scene along with her and took the keys to the SUV, concealing the id of Watlington as the motive force. The courtroom discovered this proof ample to help Felton’s convictions. The courtroom additionally rejected Felton’s problem to the language of her indictments, discovering no deadly variance from the proof at trial.
Felton argued that she shouldn’t be topic to a number of convictions for accent after the actual fact; the courtroom rejected this, explaining “the context of [G.S.] 14-7 clearly signifies that the legislature meant the allowable unit of prosecution to be every felony for which the principal dedicated and the accent assisted after the actual fact.” Id. at 27. The courtroom then thought of Felton’s argument that she was convicted as accent after the actual fact to hit and run for merely leaving the scene. Rejecting this argument, the courtroom pointed to the various different features of Felton’s culpability after the crashes, together with taking the SUV’s keys and concealing Watlington’s id as the motive force. Nonetheless, the courtroom arrested judgment on three of Felton’s convictions, because it had completed for Watlington’s hit and run convictions mentioned above.
Felton then challenged the jury directions, arguing they offered a idea of guilt not alleged within the indictments, particularly that she assisted Watlington in making an attempt to flee. The courtroom famous the circumstantial proof of Felton possessing the SUV keys and that this didn’t characterize a stand-alone idea of guilt, rejecting Felton’s argument. Lastly, the courtroom rejected Felton’s problem to the closing argument, noting that regulation enforcement physique cam footage supported the inference that Felton and Watlington have been collectively when apprehended.
