Hormuz in the Crosshairs: How Pakistan is Shielding Its Trade from the US-Iran War – Quwa

The Pakistan Navy (PN) launched Operation Muhafiz-ul-Bahr on 9 March 2026 to escort Pakistani service provider vessels and shield the nation’s sea strains of communication (SLOCs) amid the continuing disruption to the Strait of Hormuz.

In response to the Inter-Companies Public Relations (ISPR), the PN is conducting escort operations in shut coordination with the Pakistan Nationwide Transport Company (PNSC). On the time of the announcement, PN warships had been escorting two service provider vessels, one among which was scheduled to reach in Karachi the identical day.

The operation is available in direct response to the efficient closure of the Strait of Hormuz following the joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran that started on 28 February 2026 – which included the killing of Iran’s Supreme Chief Ali Khamenei. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) retaliated with missile and drone strikes on US army bases and civilian infrastructure throughout the Gulf, and warned that it could goal vessels trying to transit the strait.

The Strategic Context for Pakistan

The Strait of Hormuz disaster poses an acute menace to Pakistan’s financial lifelines. Roughly 90% of Pakistan’s commerce is performed through sea, and the nation is closely depending on vitality imports – together with oil and liquefied pure fuel (LNG) – that transit via or close to the strait.

Nonetheless, Pakistan is just not a belligerent on this battle. The PN is just not conducting fight operations in opposition to any celebration; it’s escorting its personal service provider ships via contested waters. It is a maritime safety operation, not a warfighting one – and that distinction issues for understanding the fleet the PN has constructed over the previous decade.

A Fleet Designed for This Situation

The PN’s floor fleet modernisation over the previous a number of years – centred on the Tughril-class (Kind 054A/P) frigates and the Yarmook-class offshore patrol vessels (OPV) – was designed exactly for situations like Operation Muhafiz-ul-Bahr. These are conditions the place a battle that Pakistan is just not celebration to nonetheless threatens its maritime pursuits, and the place the PN must mission presence, escort delivery, and deter threats with out escalating into hostilities.

The 4 Tughril-class frigates, all commissioned between 2022 and 2023, give the PN a reputable multi-mission escort functionality. At 4,200 tonnes, armed with CM-302 supersonic anti-ship missiles, a 32-cell vertical launch system (VLS) for LY-80N surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and Kind 1130 close-in weapon methods (CIWS), the Kind 054A/P can present layered air and floor defence to service provider convoys working in contested waters. (For an in depth breakdown of the Kind 054A/P’s configuration and the way it compares to the PLAN variant, see the  profile of the Tughril-class frigate.)

On this vein, the Tughril-class’ air defence suite is especially related. In an atmosphere the place Iran has deployed drones and missiles in opposition to industrial delivery – and the place insurers have successfully withdrawn protection for the strait – the power to supply an SAM and CIWS umbrella over service provider vessels is a tangible deterrent that might allow PNSC ships to transit the place unescorted vessels can’t. (For extra on how the PN’s air defence atmosphere has advanced throughout its floor fleet, see The Progress of Pakistan’s Air Defence Setting on Quwa Premium.)

The Yarmook-class OPVs fill a complementary position. The PN now operates 4 of those ships – two 2,300-tonne Batch I vessels (PNS Yarmook, PNS Tabuk) and two 2,600-tonne Batch II ships (PNS Hunain, PNS Yamama). These are lower-cost platforms designed for sustained maritime patrol, surveillance, and presence operations. In July 2024, PNS Yarmook was deployed on an identical maritime patrol mission amid the Purple Sea disaster attributable to Houthi assaults on delivery.

Thus, the OPVs supply the PN a technique to preserve a persistent presence throughout a wider space with out tying up its extra succesful – and dearer – frigates for routine patrol duties. One can see the PN utilizing the Yarmook-class to observe and escort delivery via lower-threat segments of its maritime approaches, whereas reserving the Tughril-class for higher-risk corridors nearer to the strait. (For a full breakdown of the Yarmook-class’ Batch I and Batch II configurations, weapons, and position inside the fleet, see Pakistan Receives First Yarmook-Class Batch-II OPV (PNS Hunain) and the Yarmook-Class Corvette profile on Quwa Plus.)

Implications and Outlook

Operation Muhafiz-ul-Bahr is, in some ways, a vindication of the PN’s fleet-building logic. The standard critique of Pakistan’s naval procurement has typically centered on the India-centric warfighting calculus – i.e., whether or not the PN can match the Indian Navy’s rising fleet in a direct confrontation. That framing, whereas legitimate for high-end deterrence, misses the vary of ‘gray zone’ and hybrid maritime safety challenges that the PN is extra prone to face on a routine foundation. (For the broader image of the PN’s fleet enlargement technique – together with its plans for 50-plus ships and 20-plus main floor vessels – see The Quiet Rise of the Pakistan Navy on Quwa Plus.)

Escort operations via contested waters close to the Strait of Hormuz, counter-piracy patrols within the Gulf of Aden, and presence operations within the wider Indian Ocean are all missions that don’t require plane carriers or destroyers – however they do require a enough variety of succesful, multi-role floor combatants with the endurance to maintain prolonged deployments. On this vein, the PN’s parallel investments within the Babur-class (MILGEM) corvettes and the forthcoming Jinnah-class frigates will additional deepen the fleet’s capability for sustained operations of this sort.

On condition that the Strait of Hormuz disaster reveals no indicators of an imminent decision – crude oil costs surpassed $100 per barrel on 8 March, and Iran has indicated it can maintain the strait closed to US, Israeli, and Western-allied delivery – the PN could must maintain Operation Muhafiz-ul-Bahr for weeks or months. It will check the fleet’s operational readiness and logistical depth.

It’ll even be fascinating to see whether or not the PN expands the operation’s scope. For now, the main focus is on escorting PNSC vessels, however one might see the PN extending its maritime safety umbrella to cowl Pakistan-bound industrial delivery from different carriers, notably if the insurance-driven shutdown of the strait continues to disrupt provide chains. That might place the PN not simply as a nationwide defence power, however as a supplier of regional maritime safety – a job it has lengthy aspired to via its participation in Mixed Maritime Forces (CMF) and its unbiased Regional Maritime Safety Patrols. (For ongoing protection of the PN’s fleet modernisation and the way these platforms carry out in real-world operations, subscribe to Quwa Plus.)