Pakistan’s built-in air defence system (IADS) was not constructed for the kind of struggle India needs to struggle.
The Pakistani IADS’ long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAM) – i.e., the Military’s HQ-9/P and Air Pressure’s HQ-9BE – had been procured for deterrence, however not for energetic, high-intensity warfighting. They had been meant to cease remoted incursions, not take up or defeat large-scale, multi-axis missile salvos combining BrahMos, SCALP, Nirbhay, loitering munitions, and rocket-powered surface-to-surface missiles (SSM).
However India’s doctrine has modified (or been revealed) in Could 2025. The emphasis is not on single-point “surgical strikes,” however on sustained, high-tempo missile warfare, i.e., salvos designed to overload, deceive, and burn via an IADS inside hours.
Pakistan’s downside isn’t vary; it’s response time. As soon as a missile seems on radar, a high-value web site – from cities like Lahore to key air bases akin to Shahbaz – might have mere minutes earlier than affect, which is a cycle too quick for centralized command to reply.
This text dissects how Pakistan’s geography, procurement selections, and organizational mindset have left its IADS structurally misaligned with fashionable threats. It then outlines what a reputable, next-generation IADS posture should appear like to outlive the opening waves of a future battle.
