Introduction
On this put up, I discover three authorized points pertaining to Decision 2773 (2025), adopted by the United Nations Safety Council (UNSC) on 21 February 2025 in relation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This decision addresses the continuing offensive of the armed group M23 within the DRC, which began in January 2025 and is characterised by credible studies of atrocities towards civilians and assaults towards peacekeepers. First, I analyse the authorized worth of this decision and its capability to supply binding guidelines. Second, I query which conclusions on the involvement of Rwanda as an occupying energy within the DRC may be drawn from this decision. Lastly, I provide some crucial views on the frequent point out of assaults towards peacekeepers within the decision.
The Authorized Worth of Decision 2773 (2025)
As is made specific within the preamble, Decision 2773 (2025) was adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Constitution after the UNSC had decided ‘that the state of affairs within the DRC constitutes a menace to worldwide peace and safety within the area’. The textual content of Decision 2773 (2025) doesn’t make clear whether or not the UNSC is performing underneath Article 40 of the UN Constitution (provisional measures), Article 41 (non-forcible measures), or Article 42 (forcible measures), nor does it specify if the UNSC is recommending measures or deciding them (the 2 choices supplied by in Article 39).
Nonetheless, whether or not a decision of the UNSC is binding or not doesn’t rely on the truth that it’s adopted underneath Chapter VII or any of its provisions. Quite, the related take a look at is whether or not the decision at hand is a choice or a advice. In truth, Article 25 of the UN Constitution affirms that ‘[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to simply accept and perform the choices of the Safety Council in accordance with the current Constitution.’ Based on the Worldwide Court docket of Justice (ICJ), that is the important thing take a look at to find out whether or not a decision is binding or not (Namibia opinion, para. 113). Decoding a decision, with particular consideration to its phrases, the discussions resulting in it, the Constitution provisions invoked and all related circumstances, is then essential to determine whether or not a decision is a binding resolution or a advice (ibid., para. 114). Decoding resolutions of the UNSC won’t be simple, significantly in mild of the absence of codified guidelines on their interpretation (see, e.g., Wooden right here and right here, Palchetti, Franzina, Traoré). Though the apply of the UNSC demonstrates that an invocation of Chapter VII often suggests the intention of adopting a binding resolution (Sievers and Daws, 387-389), a Chapter VI decision may be binding as nicely (Namibia opinion, paras. 113 and 115). Authorities agree {that a} decision could embody each some paragraphs that make use of binding language and different paragraphs which have the character of suggestions (Wooden and Sthoeger, 32). Accordingly, it’s essential to supply a line-by-line evaluation of the language adopted in Decision 2773 (2025).
Each time the UNSC makes use of the phrase ‘decides’ or ‘calls for’ it’s offering for a binding resolution (e.g., D’Argent, 1167; Sievers and Daws, 382; Bjorge). Thus, it’s a resolution of the UNSC that the M23 shall instantly stop hostilities, withdraw from all managed areas, and absolutely reverse the institution of illegitimate parallel administrations (Decision 2773 (2025), para. 2). It’s a resolution that this withdrawal shall not be impeded (ibid.). Likewise, the provisions that every one events should permit humanitarian reduction (ibid., para. 10), should stop assaults towards peacekeepers and actions impeding their mandate (ibid., para. 14), and should stop varied actions that will endanger air operations of peacekeepers and humanitarian actors (ibid., para. 16), are all selections with binding character.
Nonetheless, it’s questionable whether or not the UNSC can impose binding obligations upon M23, which is a non-state armed group. Article 25 of the UN Constitution pertains to obligations accepted by member states, that are the one addressees of this obligation (Kato). Equally, Article 41 refers to member states solely because the addresses of an obligation to use non-forcible measures. Accordingly, in apply, states implement towards non-state actors most of these obligations imposed by the UNSC, e.g. within the area of sanctions (Peters, 801-802; Sievers and Daws, 392). Nonetheless, the ICJ has not excluded that the UNSC can impose obligations on non-state actors (Kosovo opinion, para. 115). Some authors concede {that a} ‘strictly consent-based paradigm’ excludes that the UNSC can bind instantly non-state actors, however the ‘particular high quality of the UN Constitution’ and the constant (and unchallenged) apply of the UNSC counsel in any other case (Peters, 803-804; Wooden and Sthoeger, 54). One creator means that ordering a non-state armed group to stop hostilities could quantity to a binding provisional measure underneath Article 40, which pertains to ‘the events involved’ (Borlini, 534). All in all, nonetheless, though it’s tough to discover a justification on how the UNSC may impose instantly on M23 an obligation to withdraw from the DRC, however the UNSC appears to be like assured in its means to take action.
Additionally it is debatable whether or not the UNSC has imposed on Rwanda an obligation to ‘stop help to the M23 and instantly withdraw from DRC territory with out preconditions’ (Decision 2773 (2025), para. 4). This paragraph is launched by the verb ‘name on’ which, relying on a number of circumstances, could point out binding or non-binding nature. Whereas the ICJ has interpreted the just about equivalent phrasal verb ‘name upon’ as a sign of the binding nature of a decision (Namibia opinion, para. 115), some students think about it to be a sign of non-binding character (e.g., D’Argent, 1167; Wooden and Sthoeger, 39-40; Kato). All in all, whether or not ‘calls upon’ signifies ‘a binding or non-binding provision is probably not clear from its contextual use alone’ (Sievers and Daws, 382). Some statements of the voting states – which have interpretive worth in mild of the aforementioned Namibia opinion (see Klamberg) – refer explicitly to an obligation upon Rwanda to withdraw: that is significantly the case of France (which refers to an obligation) and the UK (with a name for Rwanda’s withdrawal). Nonetheless, different states, solely referred to the withdrawal of M23 of their explanatory statements (e.g., China).
Does the UNSC Take into account that Rwanda Is Occupying Parts of DRC?
Decision 2773 (2025) affirms that Rwanda is taking part within the M23 offensive (para. 6 of the preamble). It’s unequivocal that the UNSC considers that Rwandan troops are current on the DRC territory because the UNSC ‘[c]alls on the Rwanda Defence Forces to […] instantly withdraw from DRC territory with out preconditions’ (ibid. para. 4). Is that this sufficient to contemplate parts of territory underneath Rwandan occupation?
Underneath Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Laws, ‘[t]erritory is taken into account occupied when it’s really positioned underneath the authority of the hostile military.’ Within the context of great scholarly debate (e.g., Koutroulis; Sassóli; Kalandarishvili-Mueller), the ICTY supplied some pointers that will help in figuring out when a territory is underneath occupation: ‘- the occupying energy have to be ready to substitute its personal authority for that of the occupied authorities, which will need to have been rendered incapable of functioning publicly; – the enemy’s forces have surrendered, been defeated or withdrawn …; – the occupying energy has a adequate pressure current, or the capability to ship troops inside an affordable time to make the authority of the occupying energy felt; – a brief administration has been established over the territory; – the occupying energy has issued and enforced instructions to the civilian inhabitants’ (Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic, para. 217). These are helpful pointers in respect to the presence of Rwandan troops within the DRC.
The truth that Rwandan troops are current within the territory of the DRC is, in itself, a sign that an occupation could exist. Nonetheless, it’s unclear whether or not the UNSC considers that different indications of occupation exist.
In worldwide legislation terminology, occupation is taken into account to be synonymous of efficient management (Benvenisti, 43). The UNSC mentions ‘management’ in Decision 2773 (2025), when it:
‘[s]trongly condemns the continuing offensive and advances of the M23 in North-Kivu and South Kivu with the help of Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF), their management of the town of Goma, the seize of the airport and major entries of Goma on January 28, and of Bukavu on February 14 2025’ (para. 1, second emphasis added).
Nonetheless, studying this assertion in its totally, it appears to be like just like the management is exercised by M23 with the help of Rwanda, relatively than by Rwanda via M23. Likewise, the references by the UNSC to ‘the institution of illegitimate parallel administrations within the DRC territory’ (ibid., para. 2) seem solely in relation to the exercise of M23, relatively than Rwanda.
Three completely different conditions have to be distinguished. First, a state can set up an occupation over the territory of one other state via precise authority exercised by an armed group underneath the previous state’s management. On this case, the armed group is merely the means via which the occupation is established. This case may be divided in three situations, relying on the diploma of management of the state that’s the occupying energy (see, mutatis mutandis, Maddocks): the state can train full management over the armed group (which turns into a de facto organ of the state), or efficient management over the armed group (a take a look at that’s related for each attribution of state duty and battle classification), or total management solely (a take a look at that’s solely related for battle classification and for the institution of an occupation as per ICTY, Prosecutor v. Prlić, para. 334). What issues is that the final word authority over the territory is retained by the state. There’s nothing in Decision 2773 (2025) suggesting that the UNSC needs to take this place, despite the fact that Rwanda is clearly exercising important types of management over M23 which can be related for various areas of worldwide legislation (Bradley and Svicevic; Maddocks).
Second, a state that has established precise authority over a portion of a territory could determine to tolerate the actions of an armed group there with out this terminating the state of affairs of occupation. That is what occurred within the very territory of the DRC, when Uganda occupied the area of Ituri however tolerated the presence of armed teams and different non-public actors exploiting the native pure assets. On this regard, the ICJ thought of that Uganda was accountable for lack of prevention of unlawful exploitation of pure assets within the territory it occupied (DRC v. Uganda, paras. 179 and 248). On this case, the state establishes precise authority however the public order within the occupied territory is disturbed by the actions of an armed group that doesn’t train comparable authority. Nothing in Decision 2773 (2025) means that Rwanda has established mentioned authority.
Third, it’s doable that an armed group establishes management over a portion of territory and invitations or tolerates the exercise of a state in that territory. This behaviour clearly violates the precept of non-intervention (Nicaragua v. USA, para. 205; see usually Roscini) however doesn’t represent a state of affairs of occupation. Armed teams can not set up occupations, however relatively, solely states in worldwide armed conflicts may be occupying powers (e.g., SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., paras. 982–988). If the armed group retains final authority over the territory, then the help and even the presence of the state, though illegal, doesn’t quantity to precise authority and doesn’t represent an occupation. In DRC v. Uganda, the ICJ held that offering coaching and navy help to an armed group within the absence of any management over it doesn’t set off the appliance of the legislation of occupation outdoors Ituri (paras. 160 and 177). It appears to be like like Decision 2773 (2025) considers that the administration quickly established in Japanese DRC belongs to M23 solely. The one function attributed to Rwanda on this regard is a generic ‘help’ (paras. 1 and 4; para. 6 of the preamble), which entails the presence of Rwandese troops however not the train of precise authority by Rwanda.
Accordingly, Decision 2773 (2025) doesn’t help the concept that Rwanda is an occupying energy in Japanese DRC. Clearly, this alone doesn’t imply that, in mild of the related info, Rwanda shouldn’t be occupying parts of the DRC, as claimed by the DRC International Minister, however solely that this conclusion doesn’t transpire from Decision 2773 (2025).
Authorized Points Pertaining to Assaults towards Peacekeepers
Decision 2773 (2025) is worried with assaults towards peacekeepers. The UNSC condemns assaults towards peacekeepers dispatched each within the framework of the United Nations Group Stabilization Mission within the DRC (MONUSCO) (para. 10 of the preamble) and the Southern African Growth Neighborhood Mission within the DRC (SAMIDRC) (para. 11 of the preamble). In relation to MONUSCO, the UNSC ‘stresses that assaults towards peacekeepers could represent warfare crimes’ and ‘calls for that every one events instantly stop all hostilities towards peacekeepers, take all applicable measures to make sure their security and safety, their freedom of motion in addition to the unimpeded implementation of their mandates and the unimpeded return of MONUSCO’s personnel to Goma’ (para. 14).
The prohibition of assaults towards peacekeepers is justified by the truth that peacekeepers, each these underneath UN egis and people dispatched by different organisations, are primarily deployed to guard civilians relatively than to participate in a battle as events (Spagnolo). Nonetheless, the involvement of MONUSCO makes it unsure whether or not the authorized framework defending peacekeepers is absolutely relevant.
With Decision 2098 (2013) the UNSC created, inside MONUSCO, a Pressure Intervention Brigade (FIB) with the peculiar offensive mandate to neutralise armed teams threatening civilians and governmental authority in DRC, M23 above all (paras. 9 and 12(b)). The offensive nature of the Pressure Intervention Brigade seems to be out of line with the normal ideas of peacekeeping of non-use of pressure besides in self-defence or defence of civilians, impartiality, and consent; relatively, the UNSC has dispatched the FIB to conduct offensive actions towards a few of the belligerents within the DRC and in help of considered one of them (the federal government). Accordingly, most students think about that the FIB violates the ideas of peacekeeping (e.g., Müller; Giblin). Concurring, I’ve concluded that it constitutes a UN intervention by invitation (right here; additionally Labuda).
For the needs of Decision 2773 (2025), it ought to be pressured that, underneath the ICC Statute, ‘[i]ntentionally directing assaults towards personnel, installations, materials, items or automobiles concerned in a … peacekeeping mission …, so long as they’re entitled to the safety given to civilians or civilian objects underneath the worldwide legislation of armed battle’ is a warfare crime (Artwork. 8(2)(b)(iii) in worldwide armed conflicts, and Artwork. 8(2)(e)(iii) in non-international armed conflicts).
The important thing to this definition is ‘so long as they’re entitled to the safety given to civilians or civilian objects underneath the worldwide legislation of armed battle’. To interpret this provision, it’s essential to contemplate the 1994 Conference on the Security of United Nations and Related Personnel, which particularly governs the standing of peacekeepers and gives for his or her safety from assaults. Article 2(2) of this treaty affirms that:
‘[t]his Conference shall not apply to a United Nations operation licensed by the Safety Council as an enforcement motion underneath Chapter VII of the Constitution of the United Nations by which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants towards organized armed forces and to which the legislation of worldwide armed battle applies.’
Accordingly, a peacekeeping mission shouldn’t be entitled to safety if peacekeepers take a direct half in hostilities or are concerned in fight actions (ICC, Abu Garda, Resolution on the Affirmation of Fees, para. 83; see additionally Dörmann, 159; Schabas, 263; Cottier/Baumgartner, 420-422). This seems to be the case of the members of the FIB who, resulting from their offensive mandate, will not be protected as peacekeepers, however relatively, are engaged in hostilities and fight actions (Arai-Takahashi, 20; Sonczyk, 39-40; Spagnolo, 170). Accordingly, attacking members of the Pressure Intervention Brigade doesn’t represent a warfare crime in all circumstances, opposite to what has been advised, though dubitatively (‘could’), by the UNSC.
Clearly, the truth that the members of the FIB will not be protected as civilians doesn’t elevate the safety afforded by worldwide legislation to different elements of MONUSCO. Nonetheless, it could be tough in apply for armed teams to differentiate between the Pressure Intervention Brigade and the broader MONUSCO. Sadly, all the MONUSCO has suffered elevated assaults because the deployment of the FIB.
Conclusions
Decision 2773 (2025) is a welcome intervention by the UNSC within the dramatic humanitarian state of affairs within the DRC, which threatens worldwide peace and safety past the area. On this put up, I’ve argued that Decision 2773 (2025) embodies some provisions which have binding character, even when its language pertaining to cessation of help and withdrawal by Rwanda is inconclusive. Equally, it’s uncertain that the UNSC can impose direct obligations on M23. I’ve additionally argued that the language of Decision 2773 (2025) doesn’t show that the UNSC believes that Rwanda is an occupying energy within the DRC. Lastly, I’ve supplied some nuances to the UNSC’s assertion that assaults towards MONUSCO peacekeepers could represent warfare crimes due to the offensive mandate of the FIB.
